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"It is hardto imagine how the tragedy of [September 11th] could have
been worse. Yet, the truth is that a single attack involving a nuclear or
biological weapon could have killed millions."
Kofi Annan'

I. INTRODUCTION

The convergence of international terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction presents a grave threat to international peace, security, and
prosperity. It threatens the survival of entire nations. This threat multiplies
exponentially when governments foster and encourage these dual
scourges. The highest levels of military, legal, and diplomatic
policymakers in Washington are currently debating how the United States
should confront states that sponsor terrorism and proliferate weapons of
mass destruction. The immediate focus of that debate centers on U.S.
policy towards Iraq. President George W. Bush foreshadowed the likely
end game of this debate when he announced that "the policy of [his]
government is the removal of Saddam [Hussein]." 2
The intention of President Bush to oust Saddam Hussein should come
as little surprise. Hussein has remained a source of constant concern for
the United States since his army invaded Kuwait in 1990. He has
repeatedly menaced his own people and the international community since

1. Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General, Addressing Assembly on Terrorism,
Calls for 'Immediate, Far-Reaching Changes' in U.N. Response to Terror (Oct. 1,2001), U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/7977, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sgsm7977.doc.htm
disarmament.un.org/terrorism.htn (last visited Dec. 18, 2002). Although this comment was not
made specifically about Iraq, the sentiments underlying it, i.e., that international terrorism and

weapons of mass destruction cannot be allowed to converge, hold serious implications for U.S.
policy towards Iraq.
2. Allies Discuss Terrorism and the Middle East: Bush and Blair on Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 7, 2002, at Al4.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

3

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1
seized power in Iraq two decades ago.3 In the months ahead, the

[Vol. 15

he
United
States will likely pursue its stated policy of regime-change in Iraq.4
The United States quickly identified the al Qaeda terrorist network with
the support of the Taliban government, as the perpetrators of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,' but it recognized that the modem
threat to U.S. power and security rises not from one particular
organization, but from the growing threat of international terrorism,
particularly terrorism that enjoys active or tacit state support.6 "Operation
Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan signaled a renewed determination on
the part of the United States to combat international terrorism and states
that sponsor it, but the operation did not fundamentally alter the strategic
or legal approach of the United States to such threats. Strategically, the
U.S. military action against the Taliban continues the Reagan-era doctrine
of "swift and effective retribution" against terrorist organizations that
strike U.S. interests.7 Legally, the United States justified "Operation
Enduring Freedom" under the established doctrine of self-defense
The circumstances surrounding U.S. intervention in Iraq differ
fundamentally from those in Afghanistan. The United States has not
conclusively proven that al Qaeda maintained Iraqi training bases or that
it received financial, logistic or military support from the Iraqi
Government. 9 The strategic and legal calculus for action in Iraq does not
compare to that which motivated U.S. action in Afghanistan in late 2001.
3. For an excellent account of the tyrannical excess and ambition of Saddam Hussein, see
generally Mark Bowden, Tales of the Tyrant, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 2002, at 35.
4. Thom Shanker&David Sanger, US. EnvisionsBlueprint on IraqIncludingBigInvasion
Next Year, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2002, at Al.

5. See President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
People, in 37 WEEKLY COMP PRES. Doc. 1347 (Sept. 20, 2001) ("The evidence we have gathered
all points to a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al [sic] Qaeda.").
6. See id. (The war on terror "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has
been found, stopped and defeated.... From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor
or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.").
7. WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM: A TWENTY-FIVE YEAR BALANCE SHEET 307,316

(Ronald Crelinsten & Alex P.Schmid eds., 1992). The policy described by Crelinsten and Schmid
has clearly been continued by Reagan's successors. This is evident in Clinton's air strikes against
Iraq for the attempted assassination of George H.W. Bush and his strikes against Sudan and
Afghanistan following the Embassy Bombings in Tanzania and Kenya.
8. For a discussion of the international legal validity of U.S. military action "Operation
Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan, see Jack Beard, America's New War on Terror: the Casefor
Self-Defense Under InternationalLaw, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 559, 559 (2002).
9. But see R. James Woolsey, The Iraq Connection:Blood Baath, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 24,

2001, at 20; Jeffrey Goldberg, The Great Terror,NEW YORKER, Mar. 25,2002, at 52, 69 ("There's
been a relationship between the Mukhabarat [Iraqi intelligence] and the people of Al Qaeda since
1992...
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Strategically, there is little precedent for a major U.S. military offensive
against a state that has not proximately used force against U.S. interests.
Legally, while a number of legitimate justifications might permit the use
of force, the international legal system does not currently provide such an
outlet. An appropriate international law doctrine, under which the United
States could execute the campaign it will likely wage against Iraq, does
not currently exist.' 0
International law tries mightily to limit the ability of nation-states to
use military force against one another." While it has not successfully
eliminated international military conflict, states nonetheless strive to couch
military actions in terms justifiable under international law.'2 While the
United States has several possible legal arguments to support military
intervention in Iraq, 3 these arguments do not articulate the underlying
paradigm-shift that U.S. action against Iraq will constitute. This Article
posits the idea that if the United States can establish that the Hussein
regime actively or tacitly supports international terrorism and continues to
stockpile and acquire weapons of mass destruction, the United States
should need not rely on old strategic policies of reprisal couched in the
legal jargon of self-defense. The old truism, that international law is not
a suicide pact,
grows only more forceful in "an age of uniquely destructive
14
weaponry.'

Experts have predicted that Saddam Hussein is three years away from
having a deliverable nuclear weapon. 5 In the face of this threat and the
ongoing relationships between Hussein and terrorist organizations, the
duty of the United States to confront this menace constitutes a strategic
and moral imperative which international law should embrace. Sound
strategy counsels swift and decisive action against Iraq and sound
international legal theory ought to support such a policy. The United States
should articulate the need for the establishment of a new international

10. In fall 2002, the U.N. Security Council became more actively involved in the issue of
intervention in Iraq and unanimously passed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441. Although
Resolution 1441 does not constitute clear-cut U.N. Security Council authorization for intervention,
it does indicate that it is possible the United Nations will eventually sanction some action against
Iraq. See S.C. Res. 1441, infra note 149.
1I.See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
12. See generally Louis Henkin, The Use ofForce: Law and US. Policy, in RIGHT V.MIGHT

39-40 (1991).
13. See infra Part IV.
14. Louis R. Beres, The Permissibility of State-Sponsored Assassination During Peace and
War, 5 TEMPLE INT'L & CoMP. L.J. 231, 239 (1992).

15. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 75 (quoting August Harming, the chief of the
Bundesriachrichtendienst (B.N.D.), the German intelligence agency).
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legal norm condoning anticipatory, offensive intervention against states
that foster international terrorism and pursue the development of weapons
of mass destruction. 6
This Article analyzes the international legal implications of the
particular problem facing U.S. policymakers as they confront the threat
posed by Iraqi support of international terrorism and its pursuit of weapons
of mass destruction. In Part II, this Article examines the bloody legacy of
the Hussein regime. Hussein's disregard for the lives of his own citizens,
exemplified by the genocide of Iraqi Kurds, his pursuit of weapons of
mass destruction, and his support for international terrorism, are essential
components to an understanding of why the United States can justifiably
view his ouster as imperative. Part III examines the existing international
legal norms governing the use of force potentially applicable to a U.S.
military action against Iraq. Part IV proposes the legal doctrine of
anticipatory counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation intervention, as a

legitimate answer to the modem threat of international terrorism and
weapons of mass destruction. Part V offers conclusions.
The United States will likely soon deploy military force to oust the
Hussein regime. Such action already could, in theory, enjoy support under
some interpretations of existing international law. Any such claim of
legality, however, does not provide an appropriate international legal
doctrine reflecting the legitimacy of U.S. action. Any confrontation
between the United States and Iraq will likely signal a significant strategic
and international legal paradigm shift, empowering the international
community to address similar challenges in the future.
II. BACKGROUND: THE MOST DANGEROUS REGIME
The reign of terror by Saddam Hussein in Iraq has secured him a
prominent place in the pantheon of heinous tyrants in history. Hussein is
guilty of genocide against his own people, committing sinister crimes
against humanity, and gravely breaching the laws of war and international
law. He has used chemical weapons both in international conflict against
Iran and in Iraqi Kurdistan against his own people. 7 His regime has
vigorously sought to acquire and develop nuclear weapons," in blatant
16. The Article will call this proposed doctrine "anticipatory counter-terrorism, counterproliferation intervention" throughout the text.
17. See generally RICHARD BUTLER, THE GREATEST THREAT 11, 18 (1999).
18. See infra Part I(E). See generally SHY AMBHATIA& DANIEL MCGRORY, BRIGHTER THAN
THE BAGHDAD SUN: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S NUCLEAR THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES (2000)

(discussing the nuclear capabilities of Iraq).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss2/1

6

20021

INTERVENTION IN IRAQ: TOWARDS A DOCTRINE OFANTICIPATORY COUNTER-TERRORISM

Posteraro: Intervention in Iraq: Towards A Doctrine of Anticipatory Counter-

157

violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 9 Iraq is guilty of at
least two straightforward acts of international aggression, the first against
Iran in 1980 and the second against Kuwait a decade later. Perhaps most
significant in the post-September 11 th context, evidence is mounting that
Iraq both actively and tacitly supports international terrorism and nurtures
an ongoing relationship with al Qaeda.2°
A. Aggression and Use of Chemical Weapons Against Iran
Hussein officially ruled Iraq for only a year when he launched an
invasion of Iran in September 1980 to capture the coveted Shatt al-Arab
waterway, a river leading from oil deposits to the busy shipping lanes of
the Persian Gulf.2" His aggression breached fundamental principles of
international law, particularly Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, and his
bilateral treaty obligations.22
When the Iraqi army did not secure immediate victory, Hussein
authorized the development and deployment of chemical weapons in
violation of international law. He unleashed mustard agents on the Iranians
through artillery, helicopter, and airplane bombardments.23 Iraq became

the first state known to have deployed chemical weapons in the seventy
years since the end of World War .24 Eventually, the Iraqi development
of ballistic missiles capable of reaching the capitol of Iran, Tehran,
coupled with the demonstrated willingness of Hussein to use chemical
weapons, motivated the Iranians to spare their civilians the chemical
horrors Iranian soldiers had endured, and the countries reached a peace
settlement.25 When the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988, the two states had lost

19. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation ofNuclear Weapons, openedfor signature July 1, 1968,
art. II, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty].
20. See infra Part II(F).
21. See ScoT"rrTER, ENDOAME 68(1999).
22. See Christopher Joyner, The Gulf War of1980-1988,88 AM. J. INT'L L. 401,403 (1994)

(book review). A 1975 treaty between Iran and Iraq had effectively resolved all contested legal
issues concerning the nations' disputed border. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
23. See Captain Sean M. Condron, Justificationfor UnilateralAction in Response to the Iraqi
Threat: A Critical Analysis of OperationDesert Fox, 161 MIL. L. REV. 115, 142 (1999).

24. See BUTLER, supra note 17, at 18-19 (noting the significant exception that Hitler used
chemical weapons in concentration camps). The gruesome deployment of mustard gas in World
War Iconvinced the world that there was no place among civilized nations for such weapons. Until
Saddam Hussein's deployment of chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers, the 1925 Geneva
Protocol represented one of the few great successes of international law. Protocol for the
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological
Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol].
25. See RIrER, supra note 21, at 81, 89.
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almost a million soldiers in one of the bloodiest conflicts of the Twentieth
Century.26 The enduring legacy of this conflict remains the considerable
advances in Iraq's weapons of mass27 destruction program, particularly the
chemical element of that program.
B. Use of Chemical Weapons Against IraqiKurds
As the Iran-Iraq War subsided in spring 1988, Iraq turned its chemical
weapons against its own people. That March, a coordinated assault ofIraqi
army and air force units pounded the Iraqi city of Halabja with artillery
fire and chemical weapons. 2' Heavy chemical clouds smothered the city,
transforming basements, the most basic places of refuge, into gas
chambers for frightened Iraqi Kurds. 9 The lingering fog of chemicals
killed thousands and left tens ofthousands permanently blinded, sterilized,
disfigured and unnaturally prone to develop cancer and respiratory
diseases.30
The persecution of Iraqi Kurds did not end with the attack on Halabja.
The Washington Kurdish Institute estimates that as many as 200 towns
across Iraqi Kurdistan were attacked with poison as in the course of
seventeen months from March 1987 to October 1988. 'Though the precise
number of victims is unknown, Kurdish estimates claim that 200,000
Kurds were killed.32 Human Rights Watch places the number between
50,000 and 100,000."3 Kurdish doctors believe that "up to ten percent of
the population of northern Iraq - nearly four million people-have been
'
Experts have concluded that the
exposed to chemical weapons."34
chemical agents used in the attacks against Kurdish cities in northern Iraq
were most likely a combination of mustard gas and various nerve agents,

26. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 55.

27. See RITTER, supra note 21, at 67. Some evidence indicates that Iran is not the only
foreign state against which Iraq has unleashed its chemical weapons. Chemical detection devices
deployed during the Persian Gulf War indicated a high level of chemical toxins on seven different
occasions. Phillip Shenon, New Report Citedon Chemical Arms Used in Gulf War, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 22, 1996, at Al.
28. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 52-53; RITTER,supra note 21, at 89.

29. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 53.
30. See Statement by the Washington Kurdish Institute on 14th Anniversary of Halabja
Attacks, Mar. 15, 2002, available at http://www.kurd.org/halabjal4.html (last visited Oct. 29,

2002) [hereinafter Kurdish Anniversary Statement]; see generally Goldberg, supra note 9.
31.

See Kurdish Anniversary Statement, supranote 30; seegenerallyGoldberg, supranote 9.

32. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 53.
33. Id. at 61 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, IRAQ'S CRIME OF GENOCIDE

(1995)).
34. Id. at 57.
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including sarin and VX. a5 Significant evidence also suggests that Hussein
released lethal biological agents during these attacks on the Kurds. 6
The long-term effects of the chemical attacks against Iraqi-Kurdistan
are only beginning to surface. Today, pregnant women in cities that were
attacked with chemical weapons miscarry at rates fourteen times greater
than other Kurdish cities." Rates of colon cancer in attacked cities are five
times greater than elsewhere."a Survivors of the chemical attacks now
suffer "Hiroshima levels of sterility."3 In Halabja, "there are more
abnormal births than normal ones." 40
While Iraq has attempted to hide evidence of its use of chemical
weapons,41 officials have rarely openly denied the charge. An Iraqi general
boldly asserted that Iraqi use of chemical weapons is unremarkable
because "[w]hen you have an insect problem, you use insecticide., 42 This
disrespect for human life permeates many of the Hussein regime's
policies, 43 but is most evident in the efforts to decimate Iraqi Kurds.
C. The IraqiPersecutionofIraqi Kurds
The persecution ofIraqi Kurds by Saddam Hussein involved more than
the deployment of chemical weapons. In 1988, Iraq coordinated the
wanton destruction ofKurdish communities and the systemic mass murder
of its Kurdish population. After air assaults with chemical weapons,
ground troops entered Kurdish towns, destroyed homes, looted valuables,
and burned what little remained. 44 Fleets of army trucks then transported
villagers to holding centers while Iraqi officials combed surrounding
35. See id.
at 59.
36. See id. at 72-74.
37. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 72-74.
38. Id.
39. Id. (quoting Dr. Fouad Babn, a Kurdish physician).
40. Id.
41. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, IRAQ'S CRIME OF GENOCIDE 343 n.20 (1995)
[hereinafter HRW GENOCIDE REPORT] (quoting letter Sh. 5/19299 from the Amn director of the
governorate of Erbil to all branches, Dec. 17, 1988,
Pursuant to the memorandum from the Honorable Office of the President,
4/4/11/44154 of 4 December 1988, a decision has been taken to give all
memoranda that contain information about the production of chemical weapons
the highest degree of secrecy. Take all necessary measures, keep this
memorandum to yourself and sign for its receipt ....
42. See id.
43. See generallyBowden, supra note 3, at 35.
44. See generally HRW GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 41.
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hillsides to hunt down escapees.45 Human Rights Watch has compared the
bureaucratic efficiency of the Iraqi mass murder of Kurds to that of the
Nazis:
[T]he range of execution methods described by Kurdish
survivors is uncannily reminiscent of [the Nazi genocide]... Each
of the standard operating techniques used by the [Nazis] is
documented in the Kurdish case. Some groups of prisoners were
lined up, shot from the front, and dragged into predug mass graves;
others were shoved roughly into trenches and machine-gunned
where they stood; others were made to lie down sardine-style, next
to mounds of fresh corpses, before being killed; still others were
tied together, made to stand on the lip of the pit, and shot in the
back so that they would fall forward into it.... Bulldozers then
pushed earth or sand loosely over the heaps of corpses. Some of the
grave sites contained... the bodies of thousands of victims.4 6
When Hussein eventually ceased his campaign of mass murder, he
pursued other means of destroying the Iraqi Kurds. Hussein has
implemented a plan of nationality correction under which Iraqi security
agents force Kurds to sign identity papers changing their nationality from
Kurdish to Arab and admitting that their birth records are "false.""4 The
cost of failing to change nationality is forfeiture of property and eviction
to make room for Arab families.4" In the most sadistic of twists, the
security forces then levy fines on acquiescent Kurds for having falsified
their past ethnicity.49 Iraqi hospitals have been ordered not to register
babies with Kurdish ethnic names.5" In some regions, Hussein has ordered
the razing of Kurdish tombstones and their replacement with new graves
with Arab ethnic names.5 ' This cradle to grave annihilation of Kurdish

45. See Goldberg, supra note 9; at 62. For a chilling account of the maniacal methods of
Saddam Hussein and his top generals, see Goldberg, supranote 9, at 62,63 (where he tells the story
of Salma Aziz Baban whose six-year-old son died from hunger and illness and then was fed to an
Iraqi army dog).
46. HRW GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 41, at 12.
47. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 71-72.
48. See id.at 72.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
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history in Iraq constitutes a comprehensive strategy ofethnic genocide and
is hauntingly similar to the efforts of other genocidal tyrants in history."
Although the Iraqi actions taken in pursuit of the genocide of the
Kurdish population of Iraq speak for themselves, the animus underlying
the effort has been made explicit. Human Rights Watch has authenticated
audiotapes made by the official who directed the Anfal." That official
mused during one recorded meeting, "[w]hy should I let them live there
like donkeys who don't know anything?... I will smash their heads....
I will bury them with bulldozers." 4 Hussein and his subordinates have
slaughtered thousands of Kurds and left those who survived weak,
diseased, infertile, and deprived of their identity and heritage. One can
only wonder whether the Iranians or the Kuwaitis would have faced
similar fates had the plans of Hussein for aggressive conquest been
realized.
D. Aggression Against Kuwait
On August 2, 1990, over 100,000 Iraqi troops and 300 tanks invaded
Kuwait." Kuwait had been a peaceful neighbor of Iraq with a modest
military force of only 20,000 soldiers.56 Former U.S. President George
H.W. Bush described this invasion as an act of naked aggression." The
United Nations concurred with President Bush and expressed that

52. Hussein's bloody campaign likely qualifies as genocide under the Genocide Convention.
Genocide is defined as, inter alia, "killing members of a [national, ethnical, racial, or religious]

group;" or "deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part." Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, Jan. 9, 1948, art. 11(a), (c), 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
53. "Anfal" is the Iraqi name for the military campaign against the Kurds. It translates
literally as "the spoils." See generally HRW GENOCIDE REPORT, supra note 41, at 10.
54. Id.
55. Michael R. Gordon, Iraq Army Invades Capital of Kuwait in Fierce Fighting, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1990, at A2; see also Caryle Murphy, IraqiForce Invades Kuwait; Tanks, Troops
Storm Capitol,WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 1990, at Al.

56. Iraq formally recognized the nation of Kuwait in 1963 following Kuwait's admission to
the United Nations. The existence of a Kuwaiti nation was clearly established long before 1963

when the Kuwaiti government effectively oversaw a fixed territory and population. Any claim Iraq
once may legitimately have had to Kuwait matters little in light of these intervening developments.
Iraq had been on notice that Kuwait was an independent nation entitled to its sovereignty, free from
interference long before summer 1990. See generallyDAVID H. FINE, SHIFTING LINES INTHE SAND:
KuwAIT'S ELUSIVE FRONTIER WITH IRAQ (1994).

57. Dan Balz & Ann Devroy, IraqiInvasion Force Seizes Control of Kuwait; US. Bans
Trade, JoinsAllies in FreezingAssets; Bush Leaves Open Military Options,WASH. POST, Aug. 3,
1990, at Al.
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sentiment in several U.N. Security Council resolutions.5" Most
significantly, the United Nations, through U.N. Security Council
Resolution 678,"9 authorized member-states to use "all necessary means
to uphold and implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant
60
resolutions and to restore international peace and security to the area.
Resolution 660, adopted on August 2, 1990, strongly condemned the Iraqi
invasion into Kuwait.6 '
The forces of Hussein swiftly established a provisional government in
Kuwait made up of Iraqi army officers. 62 The Iraqi reign over Kuwait was
marked by brutality. Iraqi forces systemically tortured Kuwaiti citizens to
extract intelligence and to punish those unwilling to renounce their
Kuwaiti allegiance. Amnesty International described the Iraqi brutality:
Two categories of [Kuwaitis] appear to have been targeted for
particularly severe torture: actual or suspected members of the
Kuwaiti armed forces, National Guard, police and security forces,
and individuals suspected ofhaving participated in armed resistance
against Iraqi forces. However, others have been tortured for
involvement in non-violent activities such as peaceful
demonstrations,... writing anti-Iraq slogans on walls, possessing
opposition leaflets and raising the Kuwaiti flag... [t]orture in these
cases was aimed at extracting information about the identity of
persons involved in opposition activities.... In other cases, the
objective was to force [Kuwaitis] to cooperate with the Iraqis after
release by acting as informers... forcing them to make statements
against the Kuwaiti ruling family... and making declarations of
allegiance to... Saddam Hussein. Finally, the sheer brutality of the
torture inflicted on [Kuwaitis] was designed to terrorize the
population at large and to discourage others from expressing...
their opposition to the Iraqi presence in Kuwait.63

58. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/660
(1990).
59. See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/678 (1990).
60. Id.§ 2.
61. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 660, supra note 58.
62. John Kifner, The Iraqi Invasions: Hundreds of Westerners Rounded up inKuwait,N.Y.
TiMEs, Aug. 7, 1990, at A9.
63. Amnesty International, Iraq/Occupied Kuwait Human Rights Violations Since 2 August,

Excerpted from Amnesty International Document, Dec. 19, 1990 inINERNATIONAL

LAW AND THE

USE OF FORCE 34 (Thomas Ehrlich & Mary Ellen O'Connell eds., 1993).
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This brutality escalated over the seven-month occupation culminating in
an Iraqi rampage of "torture, kidnapping, rape and pillage over the final
days of occupation.""
In February 1991, the United States led a coalition of forces in a
military rout of the Iraqi occupiers.65 Despite the fact that Iraqi military
personnel outnumbered allied forces by a ratio of three to two, the allies
easily drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. The allied forces captured some
50,000 Iraqi prisoners of war, inflicted tens of thousands of casualties and,
in the opinion of U.S. General Norman Schwarzkopf, reduced the Iraqi
Army to the point where"[t]here [was] not enough left for [Hussein] to be
a regional threat."
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the first instance since the inception
of the United Nations that a U.N. member used force in an attempt to
absorb another state.67 Iraq has not engaged in an act of aggression
comparable to its forays against Iran and Kuwait since the conclusion of
the Persian Gulf War. The U.S. Government's policy of containment may
be the most significant cause of this restraint on the part of Saddam
Hussein. Iraq has been closely monitored since the end of the Persian Gulf
War. No-fly zones established at the end of the war still protect Kurdish
populations in Northern Iraq and Shia groups in Southern Iraq.
Nevertheless, in the decade since the conclusion of Operation Desert
Storm, Iraq has significantly rebuilt its military, particularly its elite
fighting force, the Special Republican Guard.6" It has done so despite U.N.
sanctions intended to keep the Hussein regime from reasserting itself as a

64. R.W. Apple, Jr., War in the Gulf The Overview; Allies Destroy Iraqi's Main Force;
Kuwait is Retaken After 7 Months, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1991, at Al.
65. President Bush's remarks on the commencement of hostilities in the Persian Gulf War

seem apt even today as the world again waits for Saddam Hussein:
While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically raped, pillaged and
plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait

While the world waited, Saddam sought to add to
to unspeakable atrocities ....
the chemical weapons arsenal he now possesses, an infinitely more dangerous
weapon of mass destruction - a nuclear weapon. And while the world waited,
Saddam Hussein dug in.... While the world waited ...Saddam Hussein met

every overture of peace with open contempt. While the world prayed for peace,
Saddam prepared for war.... Regrettably we now believe that only force will
make him leave.
27 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs.Doc. 50 (Jan. 16, 1991).
66. Apple, Jr., supra note 64, at Al.
67. BUTLER, supra note 17, at 34.
68. Daniel Byman et al., Can Saddam be Toppled?, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 27.
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regional threat. A large component of this rearmament has likely included
advancements in the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs.
E. Iraq andInternationalTerrorism
The Persian Gulf War cease-fire resolutions forbid Iraq from

committing or supporting any acts of international terrorism. Iraq was not
to ".... allow any organization directed towards commission of [terrorist]
acts to operate within [Iraqi] territory and [was] to condemn unequivocally
and renounce all acts, methods and practices of terrorism."69 Yet, Iraq long
ago adopted organized terror as a tool of statecraft and has shown no

intention of renouncing its support of international terrorism. Past
examples of Iraqi terrorism include several assassination plots. As the

Persian Gulf War coalition finalized plans to repel Iraq from Kuwait, in
1991, Iraq sent out "hit" squads to attack international diplomatic missions
and officials."° Furthermore, in 1993 Kuwaiti authorities seized a Toyota
Landcruiser rigged with Iraqi explosives intended to assassinate former
President71 George H.W. Bush during a visit to celebrate the liberation of

Kuwait.

Although no facts in the public domain have conclusively linked Iraq
to the planning or execution of the September 1 th terrorist attacks, there

is some evidence that Iraqi government officials may have played a role.
CIA director George Tenent has cautioned that "[as] to... September 11,
the jury is still out.... [I]t would be a mistake to dismiss the possibility
of state sponsorship. 72 When it comes to the Iraqi sponsorship of
terrorism, former CIA Director R. James Woolsey
has pointed out,
73
"absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."

69. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2981st mtg., § H(32), U.N. Doc. S/Res/687
(1991).
70. See BUTLER, supra note 17, at 35.
71. Michele L. Malvesti, The New World Disorder: Bombing Bin Laden: Assessing the
Effectiveness ofAir Strikes as a Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 17,20
(2002).
72. Worldwide Threats to US. NationalSecurity: HearingBefore the Senate ArmedServices
Committee, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Director George Tenet, Central Intelligence Agency).
See also Jim Mannion, Iraq has had Contacts with al-Qaeda, Tactical Cooperation Possible: CIA
Director, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 20, 2002.
73. Woolsey, supra note 9, at 20. A significant and often forgotten fact is that Iraq was linked
to the original World Trade Center bombing in 1993. Id.; see also Gary Schmitt, Why Iraq?; If
Saddam Stays in Power, the War on Terrorism Will Have Failed, WKLY. STANDARD, Oct. 29, 2001,
at 13 ("The mastermind behind the plot was linked to Iraq (via a passport and other details), and
a second key figure in the bombing fled soon afterwards to Iraq."); see also Claudia Winkler, The
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Iraq has been linked to the al Qaeda terrorist network responsible for
the September 1Ith attacks. A credible report in December 2002 indicated
that Iraq has smuggled significant quantities of the lethal VX nerve agent
to al Qaeda operatives in Turkey. This report marks "two significant
milestones. It would be the first known acquisition of a nonconventional
weapon other than cyanide by al Qaeda... [and] the most concreate
evidence to support the charge... that al Qaeda terrorists receive material
assistance in Iraq."'74 Furthermore, Czech Republic intelligence officials
have confirmed that the alleged mastermind of the attacks, Mohammad
Atta, met a high-ranking Mukhabarat official in summer 2001 in Prague."1
Hussein recently hosted Ayman al-Zawahiri, a top leader of al Qaeda, for
a personal meeting at one of his Baghdad palaces.76 Hussein also regularly
sent his own emissaries to Afghanistan to meet with Osama bin Laden and
other al Qaeda leaders." Muhammad Mansour Shahaab, an Iranian
smuggler captured by Kurdish intelligence officials, has divulged specific
information linking the Iraqi Mukhabarat to international terrorism and al
Qaeda. He served as an agent for the Mukhabarat over the course of
several missions, at first smuggling
basic explosives and rifles from Iraq
78
into Iran and Afghanistan.
More ominously, Mukhabarat agents paid Shahaab $10,000 to transport
several dozen refrigerator motors attached to canisters filled with an
unknown liquid from Iraq to Taliban agents in Afghanistan. 9 When
Shahaab inquired as to the contents of the canisters, he was told that they
contained "my life, and your life." 8 Shahaab asserts that contacts such as
these are part of a "relationship between the Mukhabarat and the people
of al Qaeda [that has gone on] since 1992.""81 More recently, the
Iraq Report, WKLY. STANDARD ONLINE, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/content
public/articles/000/000/000/376qesgj.asp (last visited Oct. 30, 2002) ("[a] group of Baghdad
intelligence officials led by Faruq Hijazi met with bin Laden in Kandahar in December 1998").
74. Barton Gellman, US. Suspects Al Qaeda Got Nerve Agent from Iraqis: Analysts:
Chemical may be VX,and was Smuggled Via Turkey, WASH. POST., Dec. 12, 2002, at Al.

75. See Schmitt, supra note 73, at 13. A bizarre back and forth about the veracity of this
report has recently erupted, but the link still appears valid. A senior Bush administration official
recently cautioned those discrediting the report that, "you cannot say the Czech report about a
meeting in 2001 between Atta and the Iraqi is discredited or disproven in any way. The Czechs
stand by it. . .

."

William Satire, Mr. Atta Goes to Prague,N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at A39

(quoting a senior Bush administration official).
76. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 68.
77. Schmitt, supra note 73, at 13.
78. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 69-70.
79. See id. at 70.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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Mukhabarat ordered Shahaab to begin to organize a series of nine boat
bombings similar to the one that killed seventeen U.S. Navy personnel on
the U.S.S. Cole in 2000.2 The Mukhabarat instructed Shahaab to load
small boats with explosives and use a crew of suicide bombers to blow the
vessel up near U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf. 3 He was captured by
Kurdish intelligence before he could execute these strikes.
The Hussein Government has been linked with other international
terrorist organizations as well. Hussein has forged a particularly close link
with Hamas and its terrorist activity aimed at Israel." Recently, Hussein
has enhanced Iraqi policies inspiring and financing suicide bombings in
Israel. 5 Hussein has pledged $25,000 to the families of successful suicide
bombers in Israel - a sum that constitutes a handsome raise for suicide
bombers 6who had previously only earned $10,000 from the Iraqi
treasury.

Iraq has also financed and organized a number of terrorist training
camps within its borders for the express purpose of training "warriors...
to strike back at America." 7 The most menacing of these terrorist training
camps is that at Salman Pak, south of Baghdad, which incorporates a mock
Boeing 707 fuselage to refine terrorist hijacking skills.8 8 This and other
facilities have been used to train a steady stream of terrorists in sabotage,
assassination, plane and train hijacking, and suicide bombing.89
In June 1996, U.N. Special Committee (UNSCOM) inspectors
uncovered evidence of another highly organized terrorism school near Abu
Ghraib, operated by the Iraqi Mukhabarat. UNSCOM inspectors searched

82. Id.Since this revelation, exactly such an attack has transpired. The fall 2002 terrorist
attack on a French oil tanker in the Persian Gulf indicates that terrorists still threaten East Asian
shipping.
83. See Scott Peterson, x-Smuggler Describes Iraqi Plot to Blow Up U.S. Warship,
CHRISTIAN Sc. MONITOR, Apr. 3,2002, availableat http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0403/p01 s0lwome.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2002).
84. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 68.
85. Vernon Loeb, Countries Tied to Attacks on Israel; Rumsfeld Links Iran, Iraq, Syria to
Raids, WASH. POST, Apr. 2,2002, at Al 1.This Article cannot grapple with the ethical debate over
the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters, but it must at least note that if anything is
terrorism, it is the indiscriminate mass murder of innocent civilians such as that perpetrated by the
Palestinian suicide bombers in spring 2002. This observation sheds no light on the righteousness
of the Palestinian cause. In the Middle East, no country's hands are clean, but nothing in the region
is quite as despicable as Hussein's blood money.
86. Mohammed Daraghmeh, Iraq Raises Suicide Bombers' Payments, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Apr. 4, 2002, at A20.
87. Bowden, supra note 3, at 35, 38.
88. Peterson, supra note 83.
89. David Rose, Iraq'sArsenal of Terror, VANITY FAIR, May 2002, at 124.
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what Iraqi officials claimed was an anti-terrorism school. 90At that facility,
inspectors discovered thousands of documents detailing past and future

terrorist operations including plans to disguise terrorist bombs in the form
of toys for children and to mislead investigators into attributing terrorist
atrocities to Iran.91

Indisputable facts, such as the thousands of pages of terrorism-related
documents uncovered by UNSCOM, indicate that the Iraqi support for

terrorism is pervasive and sophisticated. New information, such as that
provided by Shahaab, indicates that Iraqi terrorist activity is not on the
decline. But terror is an inherently clandestine activity. That so much is
publicly known of Iraqi-supported terrorism is disturbing -

that which is

not yet known is what the international community must fear.
F. The IraqiPursuitof Weapons of Mass Destruction
1. International Law of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The international community has drawn multilateral guidelines to
control the spread of weapons of mass destruction, yet the Iraqi weapons
programs have clearly and repeatedly transgressed most of these specific
norms. The constant Iraqi pursuit of weapons of mass destruction
constitutes a serious threat to the international community and to the
overall effectiveness of these multilateral weapons of mass destruction
regimes.
The 1925 Geneva Protocol limited the ability of states to deploy
chemical and biological weapons (nuclear technology was two decades
hence). This treaty, however, made no specific effort to ban the acquisition
of such weapons.92 To begin to rectify this omission, the states party to the
1925 Geneva Protocol reconvened in January of 1989 and agreed upon a
declaration establishing the objective of universal elimination of chemical
weapons.93 Iraq ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol and is a signatory of the
1989 declaration. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
explicitly prohibits even signatory states from "acts which would defeat

90. RITTER, supra note 2 1,at 120-21.
91. Id.
92. See generally Geneva Protocol, supra note 24.
93. See Final Declaration by the Conference of State Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and
other Interested States on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Jan 11, 1989, U.N. Doc. A/44/88
(1989). Iraq has subscribed to this declaration.
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the object and purpose" of these agreements.94 Yet, as is evidenced by the
Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iranians and Iraqi Kurds, Iraq has
egregiously violated these treaties.
With the promulgation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of
1968, international law sought to prevent the spread of the most dangerous
weapons in the world. 95 In that treaty, Iraq and other non-nuclear weapons
states committed "not to receive[,]... manufacture[,... seek or receive
any assistance in the96 manufacture of nuclear weapons[,] or other nuclear
explosive devices.,
This approach to nuclear weapons was then extended to biological
weapons in 1972 with the creation of the Biological Weapons
Convention.97 This Convention committed states "never in any
circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or
retain" biological weapons," and to "destroy, or to divert to peaceful
purposes ... not later than nine months after entry into force of the
Convention" all biological weapons, including "agents toxins weapons,
equipment and means of delivery." This Convention articulates the
clearest of norms that the state signatories are to abide by."°° Iraq is a
signatory of the Biological Weapons Convention.
These conventions, the 1925 Geneva Convention together with the
1989 Declaration, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the

94. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 1155 U.N.T.S. 332
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]. Iraq is not a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties is, however, declaratory of customary
international law. See JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEoAL SYSTEM, 993-94
(3d ed. 1988).
95. See Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, supra note 19.
96. Id. art. II.
97. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and their Destruction, Mar. 26, 1975, 1015
U.N.T.S. 163 [hereinafter Biological Weapons Convention].
98. Id. art. I.
99. Id. art. IT.
100. The international community is currently attempting to strengthen these norms with
enforcement mechanisms. See Barry Kellman, An International Criminal Law Approach to
Bioterrorism, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 721,726 (2000).
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1972 Biological Weapons Convention, bind Iraq.' ' Actions in direct
contravention of the terms of these instruments, such as the development
and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, certainly defeat the
object and purpose of these agreements. Together they demonstrate the
profound concern of the international community over the spread of
weapons of mass destruction. Iraq grievously violated each of these
covenants, and thereby entrenched itself as an international pariah.
2. Iraqi Commitments under the Gulf War: Cease-Fire Resolutions
Once coalition forces removed the Iraqi military from Kuwait, U.S. and
U.N. diplomats conditioned the end of hostilities on the elimination of the
capacity of Iraq to acquire weapons of mass destruction. U.S. Secretary of
State James Baker emphasized that, "[o]ur position is[:] [A]s long as that
particular Government continues in power, we'll want to make certain...
that there are some sort of constraints on rearmament and... particularly
weapons of mass destruction."' 2 No formal peace treaty was ever signed
between Iraq and the nations that liberated Kuwait. 3 Instead, the U.N.
Security Council approved a series of cease-fire resolutions, detailing the
measures required of Iraq. The U.N. Security Council passed the most
important of these resolutions, Resolution 687,' °4 in April of 1991.0 U.N.
Security Council Resolution 687 required Iraq to:
unconditionally accept the destruction, removal or rendering
harmless, under international supervision of:

101. See Vienna Convention, supra note 94, art. 18:
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments
constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance of approval, until it shall

have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (2) it has
expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the
treaty and provided that such entry into is not unduly delayed.

Id.
102. Andrew Rosenthal, Bush DeclaresHalt to Allied Offensive; DeclaresKuwait Free,Iraq
Beaten; Sets StiffTerms For Full Cease-Fire,N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 28, 1991, at Al.

103. The significance of there being no formal peace treaty, or even cease-fire declaration, is
that the matter of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait remains unconcluded under international law. See
BUTLER, supra note 17, at 39.
104. See id.
105. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 69.
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(a)All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents
and all related subsystems and components and all research,
development, support and manufacturing facilities;
(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150
kilometers and related major parts, and repair and production
facilities....
This resolution also created UNSCOM to "carry out immediate on-site
inspection of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities ....
Furthermore, Resolution 687 vested the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) with monitoring the Iraqi nuclear weapons programs and
their capacity.' ° Resolution 687 specifically prohibited Iraq from
acquiring or developing nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons materials, or
any components or manufacturing facilities for nuclear weapons."
Iraqi noncompliance with Resolution 687 began immediately. The
United Nations gave Iraq fifteen days to provide a disclosure statement
detailing its inventory of weapons of mass destruction and the ingredients
and mechanisms it had developed to create them." ° The original Iraqi
report was a few handwritten scribbles listing a handful of items allegedly
already destroyed."' Even eight years later, in the final report of
UNSCOM to the U.N. Security Council, the Iraqi statements remained
nonsense 2 in the opinion of UNSCOM inspectors and international
experts."
3. Iraqi Chemical and Biological Weapons
Iraqi defectors have revealed that the Iraqi military had already actively
pursued chemical weapons by the mid-1970s." 3 Former-Iraqi Foreign

106. Id. § 8(a) & (b).
107. Id. § 9(b)(1).

108. Id. §§ 12, 13.
109. Id. § 12.
110. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 69, § (9)(a).
111. See BUTLER, supra note 17, at 50.

112. See id. at 51. On December 8, 2002, Iraq claimed to finally provide a comprehensive
declaration proving it had destroyed all of its weapons of mass destruction. In this 11,000 page
report, the Iraqis offer "no new evidence" to support their claims. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, IraqLacks
New ProofofArms Destruction: U.S., UN. Had Demanded Evidence for Claims, WASH. POST,
Dec. 9, 2002, at A16. In offering the massive document, Iraq appears to have changed its
obstruction policy from one of un-cooperation to one of over-cooperation, effectively appearing
to cooperate but burying the United Nations in a meaningless blizzard of documents. Id.
113. RrTrER,supra note 21, at 83. This revelation was made by Lieutenant General Nizar Abd
al-Karim al-Khazraji, the former chief-of-staff of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense.
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Minister Tarik Aziz has confirmed that Iraq had developed weapons of
mass destruction "in order to deal with the Persians and the Jews.""' 4 The
program advanced from initially producing simple mustard gas, to
eventually concocting sophisticated nerve agents such as sarin and VX." 5
also began an aggressive program to
During the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq
16
develop biological weapons."
UNSCOM confirmed the extent ofthe frighteningly sophisticated Iraqi
chemical, biological and ballistic missile programs, beginning in April

1991.117 Despite the constant Iraqi policies of evasion, deceit, and
concealment," 8 UNSCOM and IAEA confirmed that Iraq had weaponized
anthrax," 9 botulism, 121 and aflatoxin, 12' and armed twenty-five "germ
warheads for Al Hussein missiles, which have a range of four hundred
miles.' ' 122 Aflatoxin was loaded into two Scud-ready warheads with even
greater range. 123 Iraq had also filled 157 twenty-gallon bombs with

114. Goldberg, supra note 9. Internal Iraqi propaganda in the 1980s corroborates this
information and cites deterrence of Israel and Iran as the primary reasons for the vigorous pursuit
of a chemical weapons program. See RTER, supra note 21, at 92. Ritter cites an official
Presidential Council memorandum of September 17, 1988:
The principle of deterrence is the best means of defense against the Zionist entity
and we suggest in this respect the following: to continue to develop weapons with
an attempt to acquire more lethal types of munitions in large quantities;... to
secure our ability to launch surprise attacks and to respond quickly to deter the
enemy.
Id. at 92.
115. RITTER, supra note 21, at 86.
116. See Condron,supra note 23, at 144. See generally Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism:
Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe, 24 HARv. JL. & PUB. POL'Y 417 (2001) (for an
excellent discussion of the threat posed by various biological weapons).
117. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 69, § C(9)(b)(i).
118. See BUTLER, supra note 17, at 51 (for an accounting of the lies used by Iraqi officials in
their efforts to obstruct UNSCOM. Among the more colorful examples: "The wicked girlfriend of
one of our workers tore up documents in anger,... [or,] a wandering psychopath cut some wires
to the chemical-plant monitoring camera.").
119. Anthrax is an acute infectious disease. It is almost 100% fatal if inhaled and between 2060% fatal if exposure is cutaneous or digestive. See CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, DIVISION OF
BACTERIAL AND MYCOTIC DISEASES, DISEASE INFORMATION, available at http://www.cdc.gov/
ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/anthraxg.htm#Whatisanthrax (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
120. Botulism's proper name is botulinum toxin. It is a pathologic bacterium that causes
muscular paralysis resulting in death. Condron, supra note 23, at 144.
121. Alfatoxin is a biological agent that causes aggressive forms of cancer, usually liver
cancer. See id.
122. Id.
123. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 72-73.
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anthrax, botulism, and aflatoxin.'24 UNSCOM further uncovered that Iraq
had perfected the purposeful dilution of aflatoxin into tear gas to
diabolically mask its use against civilian populations.' 25 These weapons
were perfected on humans during programs (uncovered by UNSCOM) in
which Iraq subjected
humans, mostly political prisoners, to their deadly
6
biological toxins.'2
UNSCOM concluded that despite their efforts, Iraq successfully
concealed, and likely retains today, chemical weapons consisting of, at the
very least: several tons of VX nerve agent; almost 3,000 tons of other
chemical gas agents; and about 500 artillery shells filled with mustard
gas. 2 The biological arsenal of Hussein may be even more potent.
UNSCOM received no Iraqi cooperation with regard to biological
weapons. UNSCOM never destroyed the 8,400 liters of anthrax, 19,000
liters of botulism, or the 2,000 liters of aflatoxin and clostridium that they
know existed from both documentary evidence and first-hand accounts of
Iraqi scientists who had weaponized the germs. 2 Iraq also likely
concealed as many as forty al Hussein missiles that have the capacity to
strike targets as far away as Tel Aviv and Tehran. 29 A missile strike by
chemical and biological warheads would devastate its target, but such
carnage would pale in comparison to that which would ensue from a
nuclear strike.
4. Nuclear Mujahidin
In September 2000, Saddam Hussein publicly urged Iraqi nuclear
scientists, engineers, and military officials, a team he called his Nuclear
Mujahidin, to work in a race against time to defeat the United States. 30
124. Condron, supra note 23, at 144.
125. Victims of aflatoxin-laden tear gas would suffer immediate effects from tear gas but they
would also develop cancers long after the tear gas had dissipated. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 72-73.
126. See id.; see also BHATIA & MCGRoRY, supra note 18, at 291. Hussein likely approved
these human tests personally. ("Saddam chaired the meeting that sanctioned using these prisoners.
His scientists showed him videos of what their inventions had done to animals. Saddam demanded
film of what these toxins would do to humans.") Id.
127. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 74.
128. Id. at 73; see also Josh Tyrangiel, What Saddam 's Got, TIME, May 13, 2002, at 35 ("A
single gram of anthrax - roughly 1/30 oz. - contains I trillion spores, or enough for 100 million
fatal doses.").
129. See Rose, supra note 89; at 131. Missiles of that range far exceed the maximum range
of 93 miles permitted under the U.N. Security Council Resolution 687. See S.C. Res. 687, supra
note 69.
130. DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
ACQUISITION OF TECHNOLOGY RELATING TO WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND ADVANCED
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This mandate is the latest in a long history of nuclear calls to arms.' 31 The
Iraqi pursuit of a nuclear weapon began over three decades ago. 132 Since
to a point
its inception, the programs of Hussein have steadily advanced
133
where he may already have a working nuclear device.
At its height in the early 1990s, the nuclear program of Saddam
Hussein maintained some 12,000 employees, including more than 200
engineers and more than 300 nuclear science and engineering Ph.Ds. 34 At
that time, Iraq lacked the scientific and technical capacity to produce a
nuclear weapon, but Iraq possessed enough bomb-grade uranium to
produce a Hiroshima-sized bomb.'35 A chance air strike during the Persian
Gulf War bombardments obliterated much of the stock of enriched
uranium Hussein had gathered. 36 Currently, however, it is widely
acknowledged that Iraq has overcome its scientific and technical
shortcomings and the only impediment to Iraq's production of nuclear
weapons is a lack of fissionable bomb-grade material.137 Graham Allison,
director of the Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs
and former-Assistant Secretary of Defense, has warned that once a nation
such as Iraq has "obtained 40 pounds of highly enriched uranium, or less
off
than half that weight in plutonium, with material otherwise available
31a
year."'
a
than
less
in
device
nuclear
a
produce
could
it
shelf,
the
Iraq is working diligently to overcome this impediment. Iraqi contacts
with former Soviet Union officials are of gravest concern. Several military
officials from former Soviet bloc countries including Kazakhstan and
Belarus have been arrested for attempting to smuggle weapons-grade
plutonium out of their countries.' 3" Four kilograms of unprocessed
uranium and six grams of plutonium made it as far as Turkey, the

CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS, 1JANUARY THROUGH JUNE 2001, availableat http://www.fas.org/irp/
threat/bian jan_2002.htm#4 (last visited Oct. 23, 2002).
131. See Rose, supra note 89, at 120.
132. For a first hand account of the history of Saddam Hussein's pursuit of nuclear weapons,
see KHiDiR HAMZA, SADDAM'S BOMBMAKER 13 (2000). Dr. Hamza was among the first recruits
into Saddam Hussein's atomic weapons program and successfully defected in 1994. Id.
133. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Near E. & S. Asian Affairs, Comm. on Foreign

Relations, 107th Cong. 19 (Mar. 1,2001) (Comments of Senator Brownback) ("Two defectors from
the regime have told the British press that Saddam has a small nuclear weapon.").
134. See HAMZA, supra note 132, at 333.
135. See id. at 334; see also BHATIA & McGRORY, supra note 18, at 40-41.
136. BHATIA & McGRORY, supra note 18, at 222-23.
137. Id. at 304.
138. Graham Allison, Could the Worse be Yet to Come? - FightingTerrorism,ECONOMIST,
Nov. 3, 2001 (emphasis added).
139. See id.; see also BHATIA & McGRORY, supra note 18, at 304-05.
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least one
plausibly credible report details a clandestine Iraqi purchase of radioactive
materials from agents of a former Soviet bloc country in Tanzania.' 4'
Ominously, a report from spring 2002 indicates that "Iraq's known nuclear
scientists are gravitating to the country's five [known] nuclear test
sites;"' 42 the risk is that they may have material to work with.
Graham Allison has warned of the devastating consequences of a
terrorist nuclear strike:
Had al-Qaeda attacked the World Trade Centre not with a minivan
filled with explosives, as in 1993, nor with jumbo jets, but with a
vehicle containing [even a crude] nuclear device ... [it] could

create an explosive force of 10,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT,
demolishing an area of about three square miles. Not only the
World Trade Centre, but all of Wall Street and the financial district,
and the tip of lower Manhattan up to Gramercy Park would have
disappeared.
Hundreds of thousands of people would have died
14 3
suddenly.
Even this horror is not the worst-case scenario. The bombings of the U.S.
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the September 11 th terrorist
attacks revealed a disturbing terrorist affinity for concerted action. If Iraq
can obtain sufficient fissionable material, coordinated terrorist nuclear
strikes pose a genuine threat.
Hussein may also have even more rudimentary nuclear options at his
disposal. If Hussein can secure access to small amounts of radioactive
material, he may transform it into a dirty bomb. Such a device would
combine conventional explosives with layers of highly radioactive
material. Although the initial blast of such a device would work like an
ordinary explosive, killing persons in its immediate vicinity - the more
gruesome cost would be borne by those in a wide surrounding area.
Victims of such an attack would develop rare forms of cancer after their
inhalation of, or exposure to, fine radioactive dust.' An effective dirty
bomb could be hidden in containers as small as an average suitcase.
Such a rudimentary device could also devastate the economy of a nation.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

See BHATIA & MCGRORY, supra note 18.

See Rose, supra note 89, at 127.
Tyrangiel, supra note 128, at 34-35 (citing Charles Duelfer, former UNSCOM official).
Allison, supra note 138.
See Rose, supra note 89, at 125.
See id.
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Large sections of major cities would need to be evacuated for
decontamination for years.' 46
Hussein's record of international aggression, disregard for human life,
and past willingness to deploy weapons of mass destruction indicates that
the threat posed by his Nuclear Mujahidin must be taken seriously. The
prospect of Hussein unleashing a nuclear device grows more ominous with
each day that he continues in power, even if molested by inspections and
confronted by the international community. 4 7 This threat grows even more
unacceptable in light of the mounting evidence of Iraqi support of
international terrorism.
5. Iraq After UNSCOM and IAEA
The Iraqi tenure of UNSCOM and IAEA must be considered a failure.
These organizations were unable to account for or destroy massive
elements of the Iraqi chemical and biological programs. The mission of
UNSCOM was constantly undermined by Iraqi obstructionism and
concealment. 4 UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors have been barred from
Iraq since December 1998. The United Nations has created a secondgeneration inspection program, the U.N. Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC), and a parallel IAEA inspection
group, the IAEA Iraq Action Team. But Iraq refused to permit these new
groups to begin inspections until the U.N. Security Council unanimously
passed Resolution 1441 in fall 2002. This resolution forced Iraq to accept
U.N. inspections. 4 U.S. government officials have all but given up hope
that an inspections regime can effectively monitor and curtail Saddam

146. See Associated Press Report, Al Qaida Leader: Dirty Bomb Possible, Apr. 22, 2002,
available at http://nuclearno.com/text.asp?2663 (last visited Oct. 30, 2002).
147. In late November 2002, Iraq acquiesced to U.N. demands to readmit teams of weapons

inspectors. The inspectors have been empowered with broader authority and fewer constraints than
their predecessors. It remains to be seen whether Iraq will comply with this broad mandate. See
S.C. Res. 1441, infra note 149.
148. Saddam's Special Security Operation masterminded the Iraqi efforts to thwart UNSCOM.
The primary means oftheir evasion was a simple plan that loaded sensitive material onto Mercedes
trucks and shuffled them between a series of ever-changing sites. See BHATIA & MCGRORY, supra
note 18, at 288-89. An incomplete catalog of instances of Iraqi nonparticipation with UNSCOM
and IAEA includes at least the following dates: June 1991, July 1992, Mar. 1996, June 1996, June
1997, Sept. 1997, Jan. 1998, see id. at 180; Aug. 1998, Dec. 1998. See RrrTER, supranote 21, at 15,
36, 108, 120, 136-37, 158, 164-75, 180; BuTLER, supra note 17, at 208.
149. See generally S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/Res/1441 (2002). See also DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 2001, supra note 130.
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Hussein's ability to outmaneuver inspectors. U.S. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld has cautioned that "[he] can't quite picture how
intrusive [an inspection regime] would have to be that it could offset the
ease with which they have previously been able to deny and
deceive .... [T]oday one would think they would be vastly more skillful,
having had all this time without inspectors there.... .""'
Former UNSCOM inspectors agree that "no one really knows the true
extent of Iraq's prohibited weapons holdings today.""' At the end of its
inspections, UNSCOM could confidently say that Iraq retained large
potent arsenals of chemical and biological weapons and the capacity to
produce and weaponize more such weapons." 2 Furthermore, IAEA had
confirmed that Iraq has continued to research and develop nuclear
weapons." 3 Freed from international scrutiny, the weapons of mass
destruction programs of Hussein have likely advanced considerably in the
last four years. 54
' The extent of that advancement remains unknown - and
troubling.
The history of Iraqi international aggression, its continuing gross and
systemic persecution of its Kurdish population, its relentless pursuit of
weapons of mass destruction, and its active support of international
terrorism demonstrate the grave threat it poses to the international
community. Since the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War, U.N. strategies
to address this threat have largely failed. Some policies have eased the
suffering endured by the Kurdish minorities in Iraq through the
enforcement of no-fly zones and have curtailed Iraqi attempts to annex
neighboring states. Nothing, however, has eliminated the Iraqi threat of
weapons of mass destruction and support of international terrorism.
In the immediate aftermath of the liberation of Kuwait, former
President George H.W. Bush refused to press the military offensive deeper
into Iraq. Many factors influenced his decision, but significant among
these were the indications that an internal revolution or a coup d'etat
would soon depose a weakened Hussein.' Former President Bush
adopted, and his successor, President Clinton, continued a policy of
containment and weapons inspections to neutralize the threat of Iraqi

150. Pamela Hess, Rumsfeld: Iraq Inspections May Not Work, U.P.I. REP., Apr. 15, 2002.
151. RITrER, supra note 21, at 127.
152. See id.at217.

153. For a good accounting of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs at the end of
UNSCOM inspections, see the appendix to Scott Ritter's book Endgame. Id. at 217.
154. Iraq has purchased several dual use facilities, such as pesticide manufacturing plants,
which could be converted very quickly to the production of chemical weapons. See id.
155. See generally BOB WOODWARD, THE COMMANDERS (1993).
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weapons of mass destruction and to attempt to expedite the overthrow of
Hussein. 56 The ruthless control of Hussein over his people and effective
obstruction of UNSCOM ensured this effort's failure.
Facing a roused United States set on ending his sponsorship of
terrorism and his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, Hussein
reinstated negotiations about the composition and access of a new

inspection team. 57 The United States and the United Nations agreed that
any future inspections must be comprehensive and unmolested. Hans Blix,
the Chairman of the new U.N. inspection regime, UNMOVIC, has
announced that if Hussein allows inspectors to reenter Iraq, they must have
"immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access."' 58 The
recommencement of inspections in fall 2002 provides some hope that
conflict may be averted. But if history is any guide, the new round of
inspections will fail. Iraq will likely soon return to tired games of
obstructionism, stalling, and deceit. Today, Iraq still has an opportunity to
cooperate; however, the chances of that occurring are remote. The
following legal proposal does not depend upon whether or not Iraq
complies with the new unrestricted inspection regime. Rather, the
following analysis applies to any confrontation with terrorist-supporting
states which maintain and pursue weapons of mass destruction. It remains
possible, indeed likely, that the United States will use military force to end
Iraqi support for international terrorism and pursuit of chemical, biological
and nuclear weapons. Should inspecting again fail, U.S. military action
should proceed swiftly and decisively to end the Iraqi threat. Eventual
military action should emerge from as wide a coalition as practicable." 9
III. EXISTING INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR U.S. INTERVENTION IN IRAQ

The United States did not seek U.N. authorization for its recent use of
force against Afghanistan because it "initiated actions in the exercise of its
inherent right of individual and collective self-defense following the armed

156. See Kenneth Pollack, Next Stop Baghdad?, FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2002, at 1.
157. See William Saffire, The Inspection Ploy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2002, at A21.
158. Michael R. Gordon, Iflraq Bends, UN. InspectorsAre Ready, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,2002,
at Al.

159. Other international relations scholars addressing the Iraq question have reached the same
conclusion. Kenneth Pollack concluded that the "one strategy that offers a way out of the impasse
[is that] [t]he United States should invade Iraq, eliminate the present regime, and pave the way for
a successor prepared to abide by its international commitments and live in peace with its
neighbors." Pollack, supra note 156, at I.
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attacks" of September 11, 2001.60 This claim of self-defense was
consistent with the U.N. Security Council resolutions which
"[u]nequivocally condemn[ed] in the strongest terms, the horrifying
terrorist attacks ...on 11 September... [and] recogniz[ed] the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence."'' Indeed, there has been
little challenge to the legitimacy of U.S. intervention against al Qaeda and
Taliban forces in Afghanistan.'62 However, unless evidence emerges which
decisively links Iraq to either the September 11th attacks or subsequent
.terrorism such as the anthrax letters of fall 2001, the United States cannot
contend that military action against Iraq would be a direct, justifiable
extension of the military action in Afghanistan.
The attorneys in the Legal Advisor's Office at the State Department
have an array of arguments to consider as they seek grounds on which to
justify possible U.S. military intervention in Iraq. Any such justification
will necessarily have to contend with Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
Article 2(4) sets down the basic principle of international restraint,
compelling nations to "refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state."' 63 State Department attorneys will likely first
consider whether U.S. action against Iraq is a justified exercise of the
inherent right of self-defense, consistent with Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter.16" Alternatively, the Legal Advisor's Office may contend that all
U.N. member-states have already secured the U.N. Security Council
authorization to use force against Iraq in enforcement of the Persian Gulf
War cease-fire resolutions. They may also argue that an intervention is
justified based on support for an armed belligerency of Iraqi Kurds.
Finally, State Department attorneys may also consider justifying U.S.

160. Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America, to the
President of the U.N. Security Council, United Nations (Oct. 7, 2001), U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., at
1, U.N. Doc. S/2001/946 (2001).
161. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370th mtg. at 1,U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (2001);
see also S.C. Res. 1373 U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001).
162. Some questions have been raised about the necessity and proportionality of U.S.
intervention in Afghanistan. For a good discussion of the way these requirements are satisfied, see
Jack Beard's article, America's New War on Terror:the CaseforSelf-Defense under International
Law. Beard, supra note 8, at 583-89 (lI]n the case of an armed attack, self-defense 'includes a
right both to repel the armed attack and to take the war to the aggressor State in order effectively
to terminate the attack and prevent a recurrence."'). Id. at 589 (citing Henkin, supranote 12, at 45).
163. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. The obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force
internationally has also been recognized as a rule of customary international law. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100.
164. See U.N. CHARTER art. 5 1.
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action as a permissible humanitarian intervention. While these
justifications enjoy varying degrees of acceptance under international law,
they are largely inadequate.' 65 Each of these arguments fails to
comprehensively justify and uphold the strategic and moral imperative that
drives likely U.S. action against Iraq.
A. Self-Defense
1. Strict Article 51 Self-Defense
The U.N. Charter prohibits the unilateral use of force between memberstates unless consistent with the "inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations."'" Unless the United States or an ally is a victim of an Iraqi
attack, and the U.S. response is in defense against such an attack, it cannot
justify a military intervention under the letter of Article 51. Therefore,
unless there is an Iraqi military offensive against the United States or its
allies, it is unlikely that the United States will be able to make a case that
military action against Iraq meets the strict requirements of Article 51.
Although the United States has gradually broadened its interpretation of
Article 5 1,167 it has never claimed a right to act in self-defense unless an
armed attack has occurred. 6 ' The concept of armed attack, however, has
proven rather elastic. 6 9
For the United States to argue that Iraq has perpetrated an armed attack,
it will have to rely on less overt actions than past examples of Iraqi

165. Creative attorneys could certainly fashion other potential justifications for U.S.
intervention in Iraq. For instance, the doctrine of "necessity" could be stretched to encompass the
broad threat posed by the Hussein regime. Necessity, however, paradigmatically has been restricted
to cases more limited in nature, brief in duration and restricted in responsive means required. Cf
John-Alex Romano, Combating Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reviving the
Doctrine ofa State ofNecessity, 87 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1048 (1999). Furthermore, necessity constitutes
a "ground for precluding the wrongfulness" of otherwise illegal conduct. Id. at 1046. While this
Article acknowledges the likely immediate technical "illegality" of intervention in Iraq, it posits
that such intervention should quickly be endorsed inpositive international law because of the likely
persistence of the threat of states that sponsor terrorism and pursue weapons of mass destruction.
This Part of the Article limits itself to only the most likely justifications that the Legal Advisor's

Office may consider.
166. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
167. See generally Henkin, supra note 12, at 40-47.
168. See id. at 46.
169. See Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "ArmedAttack" in Article 51 of the
UN. Charter,43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 41 (2002).
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aggression against Iran in 1981 and Kuwait in 1990. International legal
scholars "believe that state sponsorship and support of international
terrorists constitutes a use of force contemplated by Article 2(4). '' 17° State
practice also supports the view that terrorist bombings may constitute an
armed attack justifying self-defense under Article 51.
For example, the United States justified its cruise missile attacks
against Sudan and Afghanistan following the 1998 terrorist bombings of
the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, as an exercise of selfdefense. 7' The United States has maintained the policy of considering
terrorist bombings armed attacks for some time and has accordingly
justified several U.S. military actions against states that have supported
terrorists.17 Furthermore, the international community has increasingly
agreed that terrorist bombings qualify as armed attacks for the purposes of
justifying military action in self-defense. 73 Significant evidence exists that
Iraq has supported terrorist operations that target the United States. 74 Such
activity would fall under the category of what John Norton Moore has
called the "low intensity" spectrum of aggression.' A full right of
individual self-defense is provided for even such low intensity attacks. 76
Therefore, if the United States can establish that Iraq harbors terrorists that
have attacked the United States, it can justify military action against Iraq
under even a rather strict reading of Article 51. The primary drawback of
relying on this justification is that the United States would be required to
wait until it has become the target of such an armed attack.'7 7
The requirements of immediacy, necessity, and proportionality further
limit U.S. ability to use military force against Iraq under the strict

170. See RICHARD ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST STATESPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 109, 113 (1989).
171. See Murphy, supra note 169, at 49-50.
172. Henkin, supra note 12, at 46; see also Letter from the Acting Permanent Representative
of the United States of America, to President of the U.N. Security Council, United Nations (Apr.
14, 1986), U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., U.N. Doc. S/17990 (1986).
173. See Murphy, supra note 169, at 50; see generally Beard, supra note 8, at 562-66 ('The
Council's unprecedented willingness to invoke and reaffirm self-defense under Article 51 in
response to the September 11 terrorist attacks is an important act.... ."). Id. at 566.
174. See infra Part 1(F).
175. See Federalist Society, International Law & National Security News, International Law
and the Use of Force, Proceedings from a Panel of the May 2000 Federalist Society Conference,
available at http://www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Transcripts/useofforce.htm (last visited Oct. 30,
2002) (panelist Professor John Norton Moore speaking).
176. See id.But see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 100.
177. Murphy, supra note 169, at 44 ("most governments and scholars, and the International
Court of Justice, appear to agree that self-defense is permitted.., only when there has been an
'armed attack."' (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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requirements of Article 51. Immediacy requires that the threat of armed
attack has occurred close in time to the exercise of self-defense.' I The
United States could not simply rest on the voluminous history of Iraqi
support of terrorism, but would have to establish a specific past or ongoing
Iraqi threat to U.S. interests.'79 Any action against Iraq based on prior acts
of terrorism would likely violate the requirement of immediacy. The
requirements of necessity and proportionality also limit self-defense
arguments at the disposal of U.S. policymakers.
Necessity, for instance, would likely require formalities such as

providing exhaustive opportunity to the government hosting a terrorist
organization to take steps to remove the threat.'" 0 Necessity could hinder
U.S. counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation intervention because
exhaustive diplomatic negotiations could prevent the United States from
acting as swiftly and decisively as possible. Proportionality is even more
problematic. The United States is considering a more comprehensive
approach than sending missile strikes against terrorist camps. The threat
posed by Iraqi sponsorship of terrorism and vigorous pursuit of weapons
of mass destruction requires not pinpricks, but a decisive military
campaign of regime-change.8' Proportionality likely does not support the
invocation of the doctrine of self-defense for interventions where the
explicit purpose is the ouster of a threatening regime.
The fundamental shortcoming of reliance on a literal reading of Article
51 to support U.S. action against Iraq is self-evident. The basic problem
is that self-defense is justified only when there has been an armed
attack.8 2 The international community cannot wait to be the victim of
Iraqi-sponsored chemical, biological or nuclear terrorism. The restrictive
nature of the doctrines of immediacy, necessity and proportionality further
limit U.S. flexibility in crafting a military response that will neutralize the
Iraqi threat. Against rogue regimes that have both sponsored and harbored
terrorist activities, and continue to possess and to pursue weapons of mass
destruction, few restrictions should be countenanced.

178. See Robert J. Beck & Anthony Clark Arend, "Don't Tread on US.:" InternationalLaw
and Forcible State Response to Terrorism, 12 WISC. INT'L L.J. 153, 213 (1994).
179. Cf Mark Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right ofSelf-defense (A Call to Amend the
United Nations Charter) 10 HoUs. J. INT'L L. 25, 34 (1987).
180. Murphy, supra note 169, at 50 n.57.
181. See infra Part IV.
182. Murphy, supra note 169, at 44.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

31

FLORDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 15, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 1

[Vol. is

2. Anticipatory Self-Defense
The drafters of the U.N. Charter deliberately limited permissible selfdefense because they "did not want... the right of self-defense [exercised]
before an armed attack had occurred."' a They did, however, intend to
preserve the customary self-defense requirements that preexisted the U.N.
Charter. International legal scholars generally agree that customary
international law recognized a right to anticipatory self-defense. 1 4 The
most often cited articulation of those customary standards is found in the
words of then-Secretary of State Daniel Webster from the Carolinecase.8 5
Webster confined justifiable anticipatory self-defense to circumstances "in
which the necessity of that self-defense is instant, overwhelming, and
leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." ' 6 This
standard has been recognized as setting out a method of evaluating claims
of self-defense when an armed attack has not yet occurred."8 7
The requirements of the Carolinecase, however, fit only a very narrow
category of anticipatory. self-defense. The facts of the Caroline incident
are instructive. During a Canadian insurrection against the Crown in 1837,
a British officer authorized an armed band of marauders to cross into the
United States to bum a U.S. ship, docked in port, and cut it loose, sending
it crashing over Niagara Falls. The officer believed the ship was going to
provide future support of the insurrection. It is generally agreed that the
British action was improper, 8 but that it would have been acceptable had
the Caroline been en route to strike British forces."8 9 The continued
legitimacy, or inherence, of this sort of self-defense under similar

183. Thomas M. Frank, The InstituteforGlobalLegalStudiesInauguralColloquium: The UN
and the Protection of Human Rights: When, If Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without
Prior Security CouncilAuthorization?, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 51, 58 (2001) (quoting Governor
Harold Stassen, deputy head of the U.S. delegation at San Francisco in Minutes of the Forty-Eighth
Meeting (Executive Session) of the U.S. Delegation, Held at San Francisco, Sunday May 20, 1945,
in I FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1945, 813, 818 (1967)).
184. ANTHONY CLARK AREND& ROBERT J. BECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW& THE USE OF FORCE
72 (1993).
185. See Destruction of the Caroline, 2 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 217
(1906).
186. Id. at 412. Such standards, it should be noted, apply to anticipatory self-defense and not
more traditional self-defense against an armed attack. Beard, supra note 8, at 585-86.
187. See ERICKSON, supra note 170, at 111. But see Beard, supra note 8, at 586.
188. Lord Ashburton sent Webster a letter of apology for the incident. ERICKSON, supra note
170, at 142.
189. See HILARIE MCCOUBREY & NIGEL D. WHITE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED

CONFLICT 92 (1992).
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circumstances where preparations for an attack are ongoing, or all-butcompleted is little disputed. But such a doctrine is not truly anticipatory
self-defense; it is perhaps better described as en train de self-defense.'"
Some scholars believe, however, that such a right of truly anticipatory
self-defense has emerged outside of Article 51 in light of the availability
of weapons of mass destruction. 9 ' Thomas Frank accounts for the
emergence of a viable doctrine of anticipatory self-defense through, "the
transformation of weaponry to instruments of overwhelming and instant
destruction. These [weapons] brought into question the conditionality of
Article 5 1, which limits states' exercise of the right of self-defense to the
first-strike capabilities begat a
aftermath of an armed attack. Inevitably,
'9 2
doctrine of 'anticipatory self-defense."" 1
State practice since 1945 indicates that states have not always awaited
imminent destruction before acting.'93 Michael Glennon has observed that
a set of changed conditions likely permits some legitimate anticipatory
defensive action:
Twenty-first-century security needs are different from those
imagined [at the founding of the United Nations].
First, ... the intended safeguard against unlawful threats of
force - a vigilant and muscular Security Council - never
materialized ....
Second, modem methods of intelligence collection, such as
satellite imagery and communications intercepts, now make it
unnecessary to sit out an actual armed attack to await convincing
proof of a state's hostile intent.
Third, with the advent of weapons of mass destruction and their
availability to international terrorists, the first blow can be
devastating - far more devastating than the pinprick attacks on
which the old rules were premised.

190. See Michael Glennon, Self-defense and Incoherence in the UN. Charter,25 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 539, 547 (2002). Note that U.S. action against Iraq is not so pressing as to leave no
choice of means, or no moment for deliberationas a strict application of the Caroline case would
require. The fact that the Bush administration is engaged in a deliberate and careful development
of military, diplomatic, and legal strategies for the conduct of action against Iraq belies any claim
to the contrary.
191. D.W. BowETT, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 191-92 (1958); see also
ERICKSON, supra note 170, at 142-43.
192. Frank, supra note 183, at 57-58.
193. Consider the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and the Israeli missile strike against the Iraqi
nuclear power plant at Osarik in 1981.
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Fourth, terrorist organizations "of global reach" were unknown
when Article 51 was drafted. To flourish, they need to conduct
training, raise money, and develop and stockpile weaponry which in turn requires communications equipment, camps,
technology, staffing, and offices. All this requires a sanctuary,
which only states can provide - and which only states can take
away.
Fifth, the danger of catalytic war erupting from the use of
preemptive force has lessened with the end of the Cold War. It
made sense to hew to Article 51 during the [Cold War] .... It
makes less sense today, when safe-haven states and terrorist
organizations are not themselves possessed of preemptive
capabilities.'94
This assessment of the modem state of self-defense doctrine has led
some to conclude that a doctrine permitting certain anticipatory selfdefense actions is available for states to utilize.'95 Truly anticipatory selfdefense would permit the use of force "[i]f a state has developed the
capability of inflicting substantial harm upon another, indicated explicitly
or implicitly its willingness or intent to do so, and to all appearances is
waiting only for the opportunity to strike."' 96
If the United States determines that Iraq is harboring terrorist
organizations that intend to attack the United States, the United States may
support its military action under the increasingly accepted doctrine of
anticipatory self-defense. Iraq's history indicates that Iraq has weapons of
mass destruction and is willing to use them. Evidence suggests that the
Iraqi government continues to foster terrorist operations against the United
States and its allies. 97 At a minimum, it seems certain that Iraq has failed
to prevent the planning of terrorist activities from within its territory. Even
failure to suppress terrorist activity may justify action in self-defense:
It cannot be supposed that the inviolability of territory is so
sacrosanct as to mean that a state may harbour within its territory
the most blatant preparation for an assault upon another state's
independence with impunity; the inviolability of territory is subject
194. Michael Glennon, Preempting Terrorism; The CaseforAnticipatorySeif-Defense,WKLY.
STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2002, at 24, 26.
195. ERICKSON, supra note 170, at 149 ("anticipatory self-defense, can be a legal justification
for the use of armed force.").
196. Glennon, supra note 190, at 552.
197. See infra Part 1(F).
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to the use of that territory in a manner which does not involve a
threat to the rights of other states. 98
There is no requirement under the literal letter of Article 51 that a
foreign government itself directly undertake the attack to which a state
responds. Anticipatory self-defense against even the harboring ofterrorists
by Iraq may give rise to legitimate, legal justification for an anticipatory
U.S. military intervention.
Any such claim, however, is still fundamentally one of self-defense.
Therefore, it is still restricted by a number of threshold requirements
including imminence, necessity and proportionality." 9 While the United
States can make a case for the necessity of intervening against Iraq, it will
have a much more difficult time satisfying the proportionality and
imminency requirements as the United States likely will seek to undertake
an extraordinarily broad intervention at a time and place of its choosing.2°
3. Inadequacy of Self-Defense Against Nations that Sponsor Terrorism
and Pursue Weapons of Mass Destruction
Neither the U.N. Charter nor the emerging doctrine of anticipatory selfdefense accounts for the intractable problem ofstate-sponsored terrorism's
convergence with weapons of mass destruction. The Framers of the
Charter "did not fully anticipate the existence, tenacity and technology of
modem day terrorism. ' 20 The literal limitations of Article 5 1, therefore,
certainly cannot support any U.S. justification of military action unless
Iraq actually strikes against the United States. Anticipatory self-defense is
a delicate and unsettled doctrine under international law. As weapons have
grown more destructive and the ability of states to predict when they may
be the victim of an armed attack has diminished, the legitimacy of
anticipatory self-defense has advanced. Even if the legitimacy of
anticipatory self-defense were universally acknowledged as reflecting the
opiniojurisof state practice, it would not suffice to legitimate the likely
U.S. intervention in Iraq. The doctrine is still restrained by limitations of
immediacy, necessity and proportionality.
198. BoWETT, supra note 191, at 54.
199. See Condron, supra note 23, at 147. Some scholars would further limit the right of
anticipatory self-defense, adding inter alia: last resort, reasonableness, and a requirement of
reporting to the U.N. Security Council. See also ERICKSON, supra note 170, at 145-50.
200. See Condron, supranote 23, at 151-52 (discussing the failure of "Operation Desert Fox"
to satisfy the proportionality and imminency requirement of anticipatory self-defense).
201. Beck & Arend, supra note 178, at 214.
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It is impossible to predict when the threat posed by regimes that
sponsor terrorism and pursue weapons ofmass destruction will actually be
realized; terrorists may unleash a nuclear holocaust next week or next
decade. The imperative driving action against regimes that support
terrorism and pursue weapons of mass destruction requires action with the
express purpose of changing the leadership of a country, not just
proportionately diminishing its forces. Most fundamentally, such action
may require patently offensive uses of force more in the spirit of the
emerging doctrine of humanitarian intervention. °2 A truly appropriate
legal doctrine would recognize a whole new paradigm to address the threat
posed by terrorist-supporting states with chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons.
B. Existing UN. Security Council Authorization
1. Arguments Underlying the Claim of Existing Authorization
The United States may instead contend that military action against Iraq
is authorized under existing U.N. Security Council resolutions. It is not
surprising that the United States would look to prior U.N. Security Council
authorization because it is unlikely that today the United States will be
able to secure new, explicit U.N. Security Council action against Iraq.2 °3
China, France and Russia have cultivated amicable relationships with the
Iraqi regime, and they have little to gain from the removal of Hussein from
power. The relationship of these permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council with Iraq indicates that these states may use their vetoes to
prevent explicit U.N. Security Council authorization of future military
action against Iraq. 2°
The Persian Gulf War was a legitimate collective security operation
authorized by the U.N. Security Council." 5 It is well settled that U.N.
Security Council Resolution 687 brought the actual armed conflict against
Iraq to a close. 206 The U.N. Security Council approved the resolution and
202. See infra Part III(D).

203. The U.N. Security Council did unanimously pass Resolution 1441 in fall 2002. The
resolution declared Iraq to be in material breach of its obligations under past U.N. mandates. It also

informs Iraq it will face "serious consequences" if it fails to cooperate. See S.C. Res. 1441, supra
note 149. It is questionable whether it authorizes a member-state to unilaterally take action in the
event of further noncompliance.
204. These permanent members did support Resolution 1441.
205. See S.C. Res. 678, supra note 59; see also Nigel D. White & Robert Cryer, Unilateral
Enforcement of Resolution 687: A Threattoo Far,29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 243, 270-71 (2002).
206. See White & Cryer, supra note 205, at 271.
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Iraq agreed to it.2 °7 Nevertheless, the United States may contend that the
scope of the U.N. Security Council resolutions authorizing the use of
force, and the staggering degree of Iraqi noncompliance with the
disarmament and inspection regime, justify military action.
The U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 authorized member-states
to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660...
and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace
and security in the area." 20 ' The broad scope of Resolution 678 may have
authorized not only U.S. action to oust Iraq from Kuwait in 1991, but also
other action pursuant to subsequent relevant resolutions, such as U.N.
Security Council Resolution 687. Resolution 687 articulates the terms of

the Persian Gulf War cease-fire, and imposed a series of strict obligations
on Iraq. Resolution 687 certainly was subsequent to Resolution 660, and
it would be very difficult to contend that the cease-fire resolution imposing

an inspection regime is not also relevant to Resolution 660, which

authorized the initial use of force. 2
The United States could argue that persistent Iraqi noncooperation with
UNSCOM, IAEA and UNMOVIC to enter the country constitutes blatant
violation of Resolution 687. Noncooperation with Resolution 687,
particularly in connection with "U.N. efforts to inspect Iraq's weapons
facilities, [supports] an argument that the cease-fire is no longer in effect
because the conditions underlying it are not being met."2 0 Resolution 678
broadly justifies the use of any necessary means to restore international
peace and security to the region.
The risk of continued Iraqi acquisition and stockpiling of weapons of
mass destruction certainly constitutes a grave threat to international peace
and security in the area. Therefore, the argument contends, member-states
retain full U.N. Security Council authorization to use force under
Resolution 678.21 The logic of this argument, while facially sound, gives
rise to a very broad authority. 1 2 This argument was proffered by the

207. Condron, supra note 23, at 147.
208. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 59, para. 2.
209. Frederic L. Kirgis, The Legal Backgroundon the Use ofForceto Induce Iraq to Comply
with Security Council Resolutions, ASIL INSIGHTS, (Nov. 1997), available at http://www.asil.
org/insights/insighl2.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
210. Frederic L. Kirgis, US.-British Air-Strikes on Targets in Iraq, ASIL INSIGHTS, (Feb.
2001), availableat http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh62.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2002).
211. Edwin D. Williamson, Comment on The Legal Backgroundon the Use ofForceto Induce
Iraq to Comply with Security Council Resolutions, ASIL INSIGHTS (Mar. 1998), available at
http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl6.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
212. There is no discernable limit as to the duration of the authority, nor as to which U.N.
member-states could take military action. See White & Cryer, supra note 205, at 277.
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United States and the United Kingdom in justification of Operation Desert
Fox in 1998.213 The United Kingdom explicitly argued that "Iraq's refusal
to allow the inspectors free access constituted a breach of [Resolution
687]. The cease-fire, therefore, no longer applied and the United Nations
fell back on Resolution 678.""2l4 The response of the U.N. Security Council
to Operation Desert Fox sheds little light on the legality of the action. Six
of the fifteen members of the U.N. Security Council, including Russia and

China, decisively condemned the air strikes, while three members,
including the United States and the United Kingdom, defended the
strikes. 2" The legality of the strikes was further muddied by the comments
of U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan who commented that "[i]f the U.S.
had to strike, I think some sort of consultations with other members would
be required. 21 6 The clear omission of requiring renewed U.N. Security
Council authorization left many content to assume that the United States
could proceed under the pre-existing resolutions." 7
2. Arguments Against Existing Authorization
Objections to the U.S. claim that these U.N. Security Council
resolutions authorize military action against Iraq contend that the
declaration of a cease-fire constitutes the establishment of international
peace and security as countenanced by Resolution 678. Therefore, the
window of opportunity for member-states to take all necessary action
under that resolution, including military action, would be closed upon the
adoption of Resolution 687. This argument also contends that because the
matter is still seized by the U.N. Security Council,213 member-states must
refrain from action against Iraq, unless they receive further affirmative

213. See Jules Lobel & Michael Ratner, Bypassing the Security Council: Ambiguous
Authorizations to use Force,Cease-firesand the IraqiInspections Regime, 93 AM. J.INT'L L. 124,
124-25 (1999).
214. Michael Binyon, Britain Says New Resolution Required, TIMES (London), Feb. 19, 1998.
215. White & Cryer, supra note 205, at 276.
216. ABC This Week- Remarks of Secretary GeneralKofi Annan (ABC television broadcast,
Mar. 8, 1998), available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
217. See Ruth Wegewood, The Enforcement of Security CouncilResolution 687: The Threat

of Force Against Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction,92 AM. J. INT'L L. 724, 728 (1998).
218. See generally S.C. Res. 1137, U.N. SCOR, 52nd Sess., 3831st meeting, U.N. DOC.
S/RES/I 137 (1997) (condemning Iraq for its "continued violations.., of its obligations" under
prior Security Council Resolutions and expressing "the firm intention to take further measures as
may be required for the implementation of this resolution.").
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authorization. This argument is consistent with the fact that the original
Nations and not a
action was a collective security operation of the United
219
collective self-defense operation of member-states.
3. The Inadequacy of U.N. Security Council Authorization During the
Persian Gulf War
The United States should hesitate to ground any potential action against
Iraq on claims of authorization stemming from the Persian Gulf War, U.N.
Security Council resolutions. Such justification is inadequate because of
the dubious legality of the underlying arguments and the failure of such a
justification to provide the necessary flexibility for future action. The
contention that U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 is still effective is
unsettled. 22' The Persian Gulf War was a collective security operation
under U.N. Security Council authorization. Without additional U.N.
Security Council authorization, attempts to justify additional military
action likely fall outside the collective security paradigm.
Furthermore, the military authorization countenanced by Resolution
678 would "implement resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant
resolutions [for the purpose of] restor[ing] international peace and security
to the area[.] ' ' 22 1 The United States would have to contend that an almost
absurdly broad interpretation of the phrase "restore international peace and
security to the area" ought to govern. It is true that an invasion of Iraq by
massive military force for the express purpose of ousting Saddam Hussein
will probably greatly enhance international peace and security, but the
U.N. Security Council almost certainly did not intend such a broad
objective when it passed Resolution 678.
Finally, if the United States relies on this form of U.N. Security
Council authorization, it will be missing an opportunity to describe a new
paradigm of legitimate international uses of force. The U.N. Security

Council has largely failed at its mission of maintaining international peace
219. White & Cryer, supra note 205, at 270. The broader argument, it should be noted, does
not necessarily prohibit states from taking military action against Iraq. That a matter has been
referred to the U.N. Security Council, and that the U.N. Security Council is seized of such matter,
cannot eliminate member-states' legitimate rights to use force under other legitimate justifications,
most particularly in self-defense. If the right of self-defense ceased to exist as soon as a matter had
been referred to the U.N. Security Council, matters simply would never be referred to the Council.
See Federalist Society, supra note 175.
is a close
220. White & Cryer, supra note 205, at 279. Condron, supra note 23, at 178 ('[1]t
call as to whether international law would allow material breach of Resolution 687 to form the basis
for unilateral action by the United States."); see also White & Cryer, supra note 205, at 278-79.
221. S.C. Res. 678, supra note 59.
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and security.222 In the winter spanning 1990 and 1991 it appeared, for a
moment, that a new day was approaching where the permanent members
would effectively respond to threats to international security. That
moment, it seems, has passed. 23 If the United States seeks to rely on the
U.N. Security Council resolutions from a unique historic moment of
cooperation to uphold the legitimacy of its impending action against Iraq,
it will be limiting its future ability to confront other terrorist-supporting
regimes with biological, chemical and nuclear weapons when such
(dubious) authorization is not available.
C. Intervention In Support of Armed Belligerency
1. Traditional International Law on Support for an Armed Belligerency
Armed conflict has raged between the Kurdish populations of northern
Iraq and the Hussein regime since at least the end of the Persian Gulf War,
when an iron Iraqi fist left 180,000 Kurds dead.224 The conflict has
continued with varying degrees of intensity since that time, and now
maintains a muted existence under a no-fly-zone-imposed pseudo-peace
whereby Iraqi forces cannot strike the Kurdish population. The
characterization of this conflict between Kurdish forces and the Hussein
Government has significant consequences for the right of the United States
to intervene under traditional international law. Should the Kurdish armed
conflict qualify as a belligerency under classical international law, outside
states such as the United States would enjoy the "formal option ofjoining
' Such a categorization
with one of the 'belligerents' against the other."225
would grant the Kurdish movements essentially the same rights and

222. Michael Glennon has observed that"[b]etween 1945 and 1999, two-thirds ofthe members
of the United Nations- 126 states out of 189- fought 291 interstate conflicts in which 22 million
people were killed." Glennon, supra note 190, at 540.
223. Since the Persian Gulf War, the United Nations has failed to get involved in several major
international crises. Particularly grievous examples of U.N. inaction include: Rwanda in 1994,
Srebrenica in 1995, and Kosovo in 1999.
224. Owen Matthews, Welcome to Kurdistan, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 2002, at 22.
225. M.J. Peterson, Recognition of Governments Should Not be Abolished, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
31, 47-50 (1983), reprinted in BuRNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD
ORDER: A PROBLEM ORIENTED CASEBOOK 270 (3d ed. 1997).
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conflict. 26

obligations as independent sovereign states in interstate-armed
The significance of this determination is that it creates a legal situation that
closely resembles collective self-defense.227
A determination of whether the Kurdish rebel groups in Iraq constitute
a belligerency under international law is a factually contingent analysis:
[F]irst, there must exist within the State an armed conflict of a
general (as distinguished from a purely local) character; second, the
insurgents must occupy and administer a substantial portion of
national territory; third, they must conduct the hostilities in
accordance with the rules of war and through organized forces
acting under a responsible authority; fourthly, there must exist
circumstances which make it necessary for outside States to define
their attitude by means of recognition of belligerency.228
The first criterion may already be met. The conflict between dissidents
and the Iraqi regime spans the entire northern region of Iraq, as well as
pockets of Shia armed resistance in the south. The second criterion is
easily met as well; the Kurdish Iraqis of the north have set up a virtually
independent, de facto state, complete with its own army, flag, television
stations, school system and language, as well as an elected parliament with
multiple parties participating.229 It is difficult to determine the extent of
Kurdish comportment with the laws ofwar, but no notable examples of the
breach of those standards has been widely publicized. Therefore, it is
unlikely that the third criterion would be difficult to satisfy. The fourth
criterion is easily satisfied by the U.S. interest in neutralizing the threat of
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and support of terrorism. The
satisfaction of these four criteria demonstrate that under classical
international law, U.S. policymakers could make a rather straightforward
argument that its military involvement constituted lawful support of an
armed belligerency.

226. See HERsCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION ININTERNATIONAL LAW 176 (1947).
227. Henkin, supra note 12, at 48 (restating a finding of the Nicaragua Case of the
International Court of Justice); see also Peterson, supranote 225 ("As with truly interstate conflict,
an outside state is given the formal option ofjoining with one of the 'belligerents' against the other
or of remaining strictly neutral . . . ."). Id.
228. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 226, at 176.
229. See Matthews, supra note 224.
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2. Contemporary Status of the Law of Support
for an Armed Belligerency
The U.N. Charter rendered contemporary use of this classical doctrine
unsettled under international law. Although nothing in the U.N. Charter
directly addresses outside governments' involvement in civil wars, Louis
Henkin has concluded that "[u]nder the Charter, a state probably may not
send troops into the territory of another state to support either side in a
civil war[.]"2 a° Contemporary thinking regards foreign support of either
party in a civil war as a dual violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
First, any support, particularly in the form of ground troops, would violate
the territorial integrity of a state.23' Second, an intervention on either side
in an armed civil war would "deprive the people in some measure of their
right to decide the issue by themselves. It is, in terms of Article 2(4), a use
of force against the political independence of the state engaged in the civil
war. '232 The International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) has also found that, "no
such general right of intervention, in support of an opposition within
another State, exists in contemporary international law.9233 Neither the
opinions of renowned legal scholars nor the opinion of the I.C.J. are
binding on states,2 34 but both are subsidiary means for determining the
rules of law. 233 These interpretations of the U.N. Charter may be rejected
by the United States, but such an approach would be novel in
contemporary international law. It seems most states have concluded that
the doctrine of support for belligerents is best left in disuse.236
3. Inadequacy of the Doctrine of Support for Armed Belligerency under
Contemporary International Law
It is likely that any U.S. military campaign against Iraq will involve
dissident Iraqi forces such as the Kurds in Northern Iraq. But the United
230. Henkin, supra note 12, at 47.
231. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
232. Oscar Schacter, The Right ofStates to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1641
(1984).
233. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 109, para. 209
(1986).
234. Article 59 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice states that its decisions have
no "binding force except between the parties" to the particular case being decided. See Statute of
the International Court of justice, June 26, 1945, art. 59, 832 U.N.T.S. 993.
235. See id. art. 38.
236. See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, International Law Governing Aid to Opposition Groups
in Civil War: Resurrecting the Standards ofBelligerency, 63 WASH. L. REv. 43,44 (1988).
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States should not seek to ground justification on support of an armed Iraqi
belligerency.237 The widespread rejection of this doctrine in contemporary
international law greatly undermines its utility. Even if the United States
were to attempt to revive this doctrine, the legal argument underlying its
approach is cumbersome, requiring precarious legal reasoning at several
steps.
The ultimate undoing of this approach is that it cannot comport with the
battlefield reality in which the United States would likely find itself
engaged. Senior members of the Bush Administration have dismissed any
approach to a conflict that relies heavily on Iraqi opposition. The military
of Hussein, "while only one-third its strength from before the gulf war, is
strong enough to defeat any confrontation by proxy." 38 In pursuit of
victory the United States will almost certainly engage more of its own
forces than could be provided by the combined Iraqi dissident factions. For
the United States to stand before the world and profess the legality of its
intervention based on support of a legitimate, armed belligerency and then
dwarf that belligerency with its own forces, would appear a desperate and
dishonest justification.
D. HumanitarianIntervention
1. Contemporary Development of the Doctrine
of Humanitarian Intervention
One of the most debated questions of international law since the end of
the Cold War has been the legality of coercive military action for the
purpose of protecting people at risk in other states - so-called

237. Although contemporary international law would likely not support the United States if
it attempted to ground its intervention in Iraq on the doctrine of support for a belligerent group,

domestic law ironically requires such support. Congress passed and President Clinton signed the
Iraq Liberation Act into law on October 31, 1998. Iraq Liberation Act, Pub. L. No. 105-338, 112
Stat. 3178 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). This law requires the United

States to support military force to replace Saddam Hussein's regime. Id. That support seems to be
escalating in anticipation of the likely U.S. campaign for regime-change in Iraq. Anthony Shadid,
CIA Met With Iraq Opposition: Agents Discussed Ousting Hussein, Dissidents Say, BOSTON
GLOBE, Feb. 28, 2002, at Al. Cooperation between the CIA, the INC and the Kurdish military

groups has been increasing in recent months, and some reports indicate that Americans have been
scouting bases in Kurdish controlled territory with an eye towards imitating their staging bases used
inside Afghanistan so successfully. Id.
238. Shanker & Sanger, supra note 4, at A18.
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"humanitarian intervention. '"39 The debate has pitted staunch defenders of
sovereignty and the strict letter of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter against
those who would observe a higher principle compelling action to end
unjust human suffering. It is widely acknowledged that the U.N. Charter
regards unilateral humanitarian intervention as an illegal violation of state
sovereignty.24 Therefore, if the doctrine were to be regarded as legitimate,
it would have to constitute an authoritative norm of international law
found in a state practice. 4' During the Cold War, several factors
undermined the extent to which interventions that might qualify as
humanitarian could establish a dispositive state practice creating a norm
of customary international law. Principally, it was difficult to separate the
humanitarian aspects of most interventions from their strategic Cold War
setting.242 States rarely designated interventions as humanitarian, and even
if they did, that description would likely be challenged in the bipolar Cold

239. This simple description of humanitarian intervention is adapted from that proffered by
Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun in their recent paper, The Responsibility to Protect,FOREIGN
AFF., Nov./Dec. 2002. A more detailed definition emerges in this Part. An incomplete list of the
leading pieces on the humanitarian intervention debate includes: EMERGING NORMS OF JUSTIFIED
INTERVENTION, (Laura W. Reed & Carl Kaysan eds., 1993), and STANLEY HOFFMANN, THE ETHICS
AND POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION (1996).
240. But see John Norton Moore, Grenadaand the InternationalDouble Standard,78 AM. J.
INT'L L. 145, 154 (1984) (contending that humanitarian intervention does not meet the Article 2(4)
threshold because it is not a use of force against the "territorial integrity" or "political
independence" of any state).
241. One of the clearest definitions of how a putative norm of international law becomes a
binding customary rule of international law can be found in a law review article co-authored by
Robert J. Beck and Anthony Clark Arend in which they proffer a two part test:
First, any rule of international law must be authoritative: states must regard the
norm as legitimate and they must consider it binding law. In the traditional
parlance of international law, the norm must reflect opinionjuris[sic]. Second, the
prospective legal norm must control state behavior: through their practice, states
must actually comply with the requirements of the rule. Neither 100% compliance
nor 100% perception of authority is required .... However, a general perception
of authority, and regular, wide-spread compliance are necessary [for a rule to be
binding].
Beck & Arend, supra note 178, at 156-58 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
242. See Christopher C. Joyner & Anthony Clark Arend, Anticipatory Humanitarian
Intervention:An EmergingLegalNorm?, 10 U.S.A.F.A. J.LEGAL S.27,39 (1999/2000). Consider,
for example, the Belgian intervention in the Congo which mixed humanitarian and post-colonial
motivations, as well as the U.S. intervention in Grenada which stood both for U.S. humanitarian
protection of nationals and U.S. geo-strategic refusal to allow a second Caribbean communist
beachhead. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss2/1

44

2002]

INTERVEN77ON IN IRAQ: TOWARDS A DOCTRINE OFANTICIPA TORY COUNTER-TERRORlSM

Posteraro: Intervention in Iraq: Towards A Doctrine of Anticipatory Counter-

195

War system. 243 Therefore, during the Cold War, it was difficult to divine
a recognized, legitimate state practice establishing a customary
international legal norm of humanitarian intervention.
The response of the international community to three crises during the
1990s significantly moved international law towards the establishment of
a customary rule of international law permitting humanitarian intervention.
First, the United Nations showed its shortcomings as a humanitarian
intervener through the botched and tragic Unified Task Force mission in
Somalia in 1992.2' Thereafter, states that desired to engage in
humanitarian intervention were less likely to act inside the U.N. system,
and increasingly sought to act alone or through regional coalitions. 245 The
lack of any significant response to the next major humanitarian crisis
provided the second influential shaping of the international community's
perception of humanitarian interventions. In Rwanda, the United Nations
did not permit the handful of troops stationed there to intervene to stop the
1994 mass murder of 800,000 Tutsi people.246 The scope of the slaughter
in Rwanda shocked the conscience of the international community and
influenced the thinking of international statesmen and legal scholars. The
third pivotal moment of the 1990s was the NATO confrontation against
the horrific campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The actions of NATO
in Kosovo may have paved the way for acceptance of humanitarian
intervention in international law.
In a display of remarkable forthrightness for Western political leaders,
NATO never sought to claim its intervention in Kosovo as legal under the
U.N. Charter. Rather, it emphasized the legitimacy (not legality) of the
action under both the spirit of the U.N. Charter and basic notions of state

responsibility to prevent human atrocities. 247 The authoritativeness oftheir
action was bolstered by the paucity of condemnation offered by other U.N.

member states. 248 Furthermore, Secretary-General Kofi Annan gave his
implicit blessing to the NATO air campaign, citing it as an example of
force that was necessary for the restoration of peace.2 49
After Somalia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, much of the international
community recognized the cost of tepid attempts at humanitarian
243. See id. at 36-37.
244. See generally MARK BOWDEN, BLAcKHAwK DOWN: A STORY OF MODERN WAR (1999).
245. Consider U.S. leadership of the humanitarian and political crisis in Haiti in 1994 and
NATO leadership in ending ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in 1999.
246. See Joyner & Arend, supra note 242, at 39.
247. See Michael Glennon, The New Interventionism:The SearchforaJustInternationalLaw,
FOREIGN AFF., May/June 1999, at 2.
248. Joyner & Arend, supra note 242, at 42.
249. Id. at 41.
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intervention, the tragedy of ignoring widespread, acute human suffering,
and the legitimacy of robust humanitarian intervention even outside the
U.N. Security Council's structures. These trends indicate the emergence
of humanitarian intervention as lex feranda, a developing norm of law."'
A recent report by a prominent international commission may be
influential in securing humanitarian intervention a safe position in
established international law.
The recent report of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty further bolsters humanitarian intervention. That report
examined humanitarian intervention and its relationship to sovereignty. It
describes an ongoing paradigm shift in the international community,
moving "from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in
both internal functions and external duties." '' This marks a significant
departure from the concept of sovereignty that heretofore had been
conceptualized as the right of a government to exercise supreme power
over its territory and citizens free from outside interference. The
potentially dramatic consequences of this paradigm shift are discussed at
length in Part IV(A) of this Article, but the conclusions of the panel
regarding the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention are significant. The
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
concluded that "[w]here a population is suffering serious harm... and the
state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of
non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect."2 2
This conclusion may bolster U.S. justification for intervention in Iraq
based on the emerging customary international legal doctrine of
humanitarian intervention.
2. Standards for Legitimate Humanitarian Intervention
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
presented a set of standards to judge the legitimacy of humanitarian
interventions which fundamentally include: a just-cause cause threshold
requiring ongoing or imminent serious and irreparable harm to human
beings through large scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing;2 3 a
250. Id.
251. The Responsibility to Protect,Report of the International Commission on Intervention
and State Sovereignty, ch. 2.14 (2001), available at http://www.idrc.ca/books/960and961/02_
Protect.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2002) [hereinafter ICISS Report].
252. Id. Synopsis (1).
253. Id. chs. 4.18-4.27.
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46

INTERVENTION IN IRAQ. TOWARDS A DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY COUNTER-TERRORISM
Posteraro:
Intervention in Iraq: Towards A Doctrine of Anticipatory Counter-

2002]

197

precautionary requirement to ensure that interventions have a primary
purpose of halting or averting human suffering and that every nonmilitary
option has been explored; 254 a proportionality requirement guaranteeing
that "the scale, duration, and intensity" of the intervention be
minimized; 21'a reasonable prospect requirement that there be a reasonable
chance of success in halting the suffering and that the consequences of the
military intervention not worsen the situation; 256 and a requirement that an
authoritative body, usually the U.N. Security Council, be involved in the
resolution. 257 These standards articulate a workable formulation of norms
that may govern an emerging customary norm of international law
permitting humanitarian interventions.258 Measured by these conditions,
however, the United States will have a very difficult time seeking
justification for a military action against Iraq on the emerging customary
rule of international law of humanitarian interventions.
Two crises in Iraq could attract the attention of policymakers. The first
crisis centers on the situation of the Kurds in northern Iraq that Hussein
has long persecuted. At least momentarily, however, the Kurds appear
secure. The northern and southern no-fly zones set up to protect Iraqi
Kurds in the north and Iraqi Shias in the south have been very effective in
limiting the ability of Hussein to persecute these minorities. The no-fly
zones have been so successful, in fact, that Iraqi Kurdistan is undergoing
something of an economic renaissance.259 The first criterion for judging a
humanitarian intervention is that a group of human beings is threatened
with "serious and irreparable harm.''2'° The widespread mass murder of
Kurds seems to have been forestalled, and as sadistic as the bureaucratic

Arabization campaign may be, it is not irreparable.
254. Id. chs. 4.33, 4.37.
255. Id. chs. 4.39-4.40.
256. The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 251, chs. 4.41-4.42.
257. Id. ch. 6. The Commission unfortunately never squarely addressed the legality of nonU.N. Security Council authorized intervention. The Report indicates that the Commission maintains
a preference for the U.N. Security Council authorization, but that it sees the duty of states to react
as paramount. If the U.N. Security Council fails to act, the international community is not relieved
of its duty to act. Note that there are several additional requirements governing the operational
principles of any intervention. These requirements fit more squarely into ajus in bello discussion,
but can be found in the ICISS Report at Chapter 7. Id. ch.7.
258. Joyner and Arend have proffered the following seven governing criteria: "(1) the
exhaustion of peaceful means to resolve the crisis; (2) the inability of the Security Council to act;
(3) the proportionate character of the intervention; (4) the humanitarian motivation for intervention;

(5) the significant scale of the human rights violation; (6) a preference for multilateral action; and
(7) non-opposition from the international community." See Joyner & Arend, supra note 242, at 43.
259. See Matthews, supra note 224.
260. ICISS Report, supra note 251, ch. 4.18.
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The second potential humanitarian crisis justifying an intervention
involves the children of Iraq. Nearly five million Iraqi children "suffer
from malnutrition-induced stunting and wasting." '' Thousands of Iraqi
children die every month from inadequate water, unsanitary conditions and
malnutrition." 2 Claims that the economic sanctions imposed after the
Persian Gulf War are to blame for this crisis are specious. True blame for
this tragedy lies with Hussein because of both his refusal to comply with
inspections regimes that would end the sanctions and his misallocation of
oil-for-food funds and resources. The oil-for-food program alone currently
provides enough calories per Iraqi to almost meet the recommended ideal
of 2400 calories.263 This wider tragedy of mass starvation would meet the
ongoing or imminent serious and irreparable harm threshold.
Such U.S. intervention, however, likely could not satisfy either the
precautionary or proportionality requirements for humanitarian
intervention.2" Vis-&-vis the precautionary requirement, it is unquestionable that the primary reason for U.S. intervention in Iraq will be to keep
Hussein and terrorist leaders from using weapons of mass destruction. As
noble as this cause may be, it does not fit squarely within the concept of
humanitarian intervention.26 The United States will be intervening in Iraq
in order to end the threat of a tyrant that supports terrorism and has shown
no hesitancy to pursue, stockpile, and use chemical and biological
weapons. This also undermines a humanitarian intervention argument
because it would fail to satisfy the proportionality limitation. The United
States would not limit itself to a mission of ending child starvation in Iraq;
rather, it would not rest until the Hussein regime no longer controls
weapons of mass destruction.
3. The Inadequacy of the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention
The treatment by Hussein of the most vulnerable of his own citizens is
surely an important piece of any thoughtful consideration of the morality
and legality underlying the justifications of a military intervention in Iraq.
The responsibility of the broader community of states to protect human
beings from avoidable catastrophes, such as starvation, when their own

261. Patrick Clawson, SanctioningIraq; The NumbersDon'tLie,SaddamDoes, WASH. POST,
Feb. 27, 2000, at B3.

262. Cf id.
263. Id.
264. See ICISS Report, supra note 251, chs. 4.39-4.42.
265. But see infra Part V.
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governments are unwilling or unable is unavoidable. 2" However, the
United States has other motives underlying its desire to pursue military
action against Iraq. Furthermore, the United States is not seeking the kind
of targeted relief of human suffering which likely undergirds the
legitimacy of humanitarian interventions as an emerging customary rule
of international law.
The progress of humanitarian intervention from illegal violation of
sovereignty to a developing customary norm of international law is,
however, extremely valuable to U.S. policymakers considering the legal
justifications for action against Iraq. State actions that are legitimate, if not
per se legal, under the U.N. Charter have incredible force in moving
international law. If the United States comports itself with honesty in its
ensuing conflict with Iraq, it may be able to make significant progress
towards the establishment of a new norm of customary international law
in much the same way humanitarian intervention has progressed.
E. Failureof Current Use of Force Doctrine
None of the existing legal doctrines adequately account for the
unprecedented threat of terrorist-sponsoring states that pursue weapons of
mass destruction. Attempts to justify international military action begin
with the U.N. Charter. The problem is that the U.N. Charter presents an
excellent device for confronting the threats to the international system as
they existed before 1945.267 While the United Nations has inevitably been
the forum of much debate on the propriety of international responses to
terrorism, its attempts to confront terrorism have been "patchy and often
ineffective."26 Confronted with the convergence of shadowy, transnational
terror networks and rogue states that disregard international law, the world
cannot rely on ineffective U.N. intervention doctrines. The cost of
continued inadequacy could be devastating.
Each of the existing legal justifications does, however, add to a more
complete understanding of the legitimacy of the impending U.S.

intervention in Iraq. The same logic that increasingly condones
anticipatory self-defense against imminent and overwhelming threats also
underlies the U.S. action against Iraq. Potential U.S. action is buoyed by

the experience of the U.N. Security Council having authorized memberstates to restore international peace and security to Iraq and the Iraqi

266. ICISS Report, supra note 251, Foreword: The Commission's Report.
267. See Glennon, supra note 247, at 2.
268. Anne-Marie Slaughter, An International ConstitutionalMoment, 43 HARV. J.INT'L L. 1,
11(2002).
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legacy of noncompliance. U.S. motivation to intervene in Iraq arises out
of the responsibility of states to protect innocents from serious and
avoidable threats, in much the same spirit as the emerging doctrine of
humanitarian intervention. Finally, U.S. intervention would likely proceed
side by side with dissident Iraqi groups that have established an
autonomous region and press for the liberation of all of Iraq. None of these
justifications alone, however, adequately or effectively accounts for the
unique threat posed by states such as Iraq, which support international
terrorism and develop illicit weapons of mass destruction. Such nations
threaten not only the sovereignty of the nations they challenge - they
threaten their very survival.
IV. THE NEW INTERVENTION PARADIGM: ANTICIPATORY COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTER-PROLIFERATION INTERVENTION

A. Reexamining the InternationalLegal Landscape
Existing international legal justifications for the use of force seem
antiquated and inappropriate. They are the product of an international
system shaped in an age of fascist dictators, dueling superpowers, and in
the case of self-defense doctrine, warring bands of militiamen on a
colonial frontier. These doctrines are hopelessly anachronistic in the postSeptember 11th world order. Today, the convergence of the emerging
menace of weapons of mass destruction and the established nightmare of
international terrorism poses new, unaddressed threats. Nothing in the
existing international law of the use of force adequately accounts for the
destructive force of the new threats, the shadowy realm in which they
grow, and the palpable and irreparable damage done by prolonged
inaction. The existing international law must be reexamined and updated
to address these new threats.269

269. One of the boldest proposals of such a reexamination emerged in Australia. The Prime
Minister of Australia, John Howard, proposed amending the U.N. Charter to permit nations to strike
pre-emptively against terrorism in other nations. See Neil Frankland, Australian Prime Minister
Ready to Act Against Terror, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 1, 2002. This proposal merits serious
consideration because of the illusive and unpredictable nature of terrorism.
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1. Extending the Responsibility of Protection to Threats to Humanity
The humanitarian crises of the 1990s sparked heated debate among
international legal studies over the legitimacy and legality of humanitarian
intervention. While the debate remains unsettled, the rethinking of the
international system induced by this debate may reverberate into other
areas of international relations and international law and help reconstitute
the governing doctrines. One such paradigm shift may offer international
law a better approach to the impending conflict with Iraq.
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty's
Report on Humanitarian Intervention (ICISS Report) reconsidered the
doctrine of sovereignty. Whereas sovereignty has classically been defined
as the "[s]upremacy of authority or rule . ..[r]oyal rank, power, or
authority . . .[t]otal independence and self government ...,27 the
Commission determined that sovereignty "implies responsibility.., for
the protection of [the] people [within] the state itself.' '27 ' The most
significant implication of this reconceptualization of sovereignty is that
when domestic governments cannot or will not undertake the
responsibility to protect their citizens, "the principle272of non-intervention
yields to the international responsibility to protect."
This concept of the responsibility to protect provides a new paradigm
for consideration of the long-standing norm of nonintervention. Under this
understanding, the responsibilities of sovereigns are as important as the
rights of sovereigns. The ICISS Report recognizes both the responsibility

of every nation to protect its citizens and the responsibility of the
international community to act to protect citizens whose states have failed
to provide protection. It is not a significant stretch of this logic to conclude
that states, therefore, must also have a responsibility to protect their own
citizens from other states who threaten them.
International law has, for too long, regarded self-defense as a right of
sovereigns rather than a responsibility. But, sovereignty carries with it a
responsibility to protect citizens from preventable harm from both within
and without state borders. Weapons of mass destruction pose a threat of
complete destruction equal to or greater than even the cataclysmic

humanitarian crises of the 1990s. The responsibility of states to prevent
mass murder of their citizens is just as imperative against foreign enemies
as from homegrown threats.

270. WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY, (1995).

271. ICISS Report, supra note 251, Synopsis (1).
272. Id.
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States that pursue the development and acquisition of weapons of mass
destruction fundamentally fail to live up to the bare minimums of state
responsibility that the international community must demand." 3 The threat
of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons to destroy whole countries
and to decimate entire populations cannot hide behind a decaying concept
of sovereignty as the carte blanche of state conduct. The relationship
between individuals and governments that this reconceptualization of
sovereignty produces demands that states act decisively to uphold their
responsibility to protect their people.
The fate ofthis approach to sovereignty is uncertain. Governments may
only grudgingly accept responsibilities, when they have long-disavowed
them in favor of absolute prerogatives. Regardless of the outcome of the
debate over the concept of humanitarian intervention grounded in a
responsibility to protect human beings from governments that cannot or
will not ease their suffering, the responsibility of states to protect their
own citizens from other countries bears serious consideration. Self-defense
has long been spoken of as a right, yet it is fundamentally about defensive
measures - fundamentally about the responsibility to protect.
By the time the United States struck Afghanistan on October 7, 2001,
the September 11th attacks had been over for almost a month. The U.S.
strikes could not mitigate the damage that had already been done. If on
September 10, 2001 the United States had known the full extent of the
terrorist capabilities of al Qaeda, and its links with the Taliban regime,
international relations theory and common sense dictate that the United
States should have acted on September 10th in the same manner it did on
October 7th. The legitimacy of the U.S. action in Afghanistan lay not in
that it came after a vicious, unprovoked attack, but in the fact that the
United States was acting to protect its citizens from future attacks.274

273. It is beyond the scope ofthis Article to comprehensively address the question of the status
of states that already possess nuclear weapons. But note that major attempts to use significant force
against nuclear states are likely prohibitively dangerous; there is no reasonable prospect that an
intervention could successfully disarm the power without initiating nuclear holocaust. This reality
is the most significant factor underlying the apparent hypocrisy of prohibiting small states from
pursuing weapons of mass destruction while permitting large states to keep nuclear weapons. The
consequence of permitting armed conflict between nuclear powers is likely to be far graver than
had there been no action at all.
274. Reprisal only in retaliation for past acts is a clear violation of international law.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss2/1

52

20021

INTERVENT!ON IN IRA : TOWARDSA DOCTRINE OFANCIPATORY COUNTER-TERRORISM

Posteraro: Intervention in Iraq: Towards A Doctrine of Anticipatory Counter-

203

2. Honesty and Leadership in International
Law and International Relations
None of the existing current legal doctrines governing the use of force
adequately account for the threat posed by states such as Iraq that pursue
arsenals of mass destruction and sponsor terrorism. The argument that the
U.N. Charter system is no longer coherent or controlling is not a new one.
Scholars have observed that the United Nations was founded on the
unfulfilled promise that the U.N. Security Council would regularly deploy
a standing U.N. military force to protect international peace and
security. The U.N. Charter has failed in this mission in two ways. First,
the Charter system has not successfully created a norm of nonintervention
in international relations. The principle of Article 2(4), that all states must
refrain from the threat or use of force against the territory and political
independence of all other states, has been violated countless times since
1945.276 This has led some scholars to conclude that states "have chosen
to change this rule through their actions. 277 The second way in which the
U.N. Charter system has failed is that states that have been the victim of
threats to their peace and security have not been able to rely on the U.N.
Security Council to intervene on their behalf. Since 1945, the U.N.
Security Council has rarely authorized the use of military force, 278 and no
standing U.N. military has ever been constituted. The quid-pro-quo of the

275. See, e.g., Anthony Clark Arend, InternationalLaw and the Recourse to Force: A Shift

in Paradigms, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1,4-5 (1990).
276. Anthony Clark Arend has identified a "representative sampling" of such transgressions:
[Tihe U.S. action in Guatemala (1954), the Israeli, French, and British invasion
of Egypt (1956), the Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956), the U.S.-sponsored Bay
of Pigs invasion (1961), the Indian invasion of Goa (1961), the U.S. invasion of
the Dominican Republic (1965), the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia
(1968), the Arab action in the 1973 Middle East War, North Vietnamese actions
against South Vietnam (1960-1975), the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea
(1979), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), the Tanzanian invasion of
Uganda(1979), the Argentine invasion of the Falklands(1982), the U.S. invasion
of Grenada (1983), the American invasion of Panama (1989), and, of course, the
Iraqi attack on Kuwait (1990).
Id.at 23. Since Arend's sample was taken one could add, at least, NATO action in Kosovo (1998)
and allied action in Afghanistan (2001-2002).
277. Id. at 24.
278. A generous catalog of U.N. enforcement actions would include: Korea (1950); Iraq
(1990); Somalia (1992); Bosnia (1993); Haiti (1994); and Zaire (1996).
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U.N. Security Council system was that states would forgo self-help in
return for collective-help.
In the face of weapons of mass destruction and continued Iraqi support
of international terrorism, the United States should not feel constrained by
the broken promises of the U.N. Charter system. The United States can be
reasonably certain that Iraq will not hesitate to use force against it because
of Article 2(4). Furthermore, the United States can reasonably anticipate
that it will not be the recipient of collective help against Iraq from all of
its peers on the U.N. Security Council.
If international law fails to address its own inadequacies, it risks
abandoning any claim that it has meaning in shaping state behavior in the
post-September 11th world. Michael Glennon has observed that "[n]o
rules will work that do not reflect underlying geopolitical realities." A
conflict is coming, and it will be fought for legitimate reasons. 9 Now, the
United States must show leadership in the establishment of new rules of
international law that can lead to a sustainable and legitimate international
legal order. This order should be grounded not in the manipulations of
attorneys in the Legal Advisor's office attempting to fit the square of the
legitimacy of U.S. action against Iraq into the circle of antiquated
international legal doctrine. Rather, the order should announce that it has
commenced a new era of legitimate conduct that will establish a new rule
of the international law of the use of force.
The so-called Bush Doctrine articulates a portion of such a new rule of
international law. President Bush announced that: "[f]rom this day
forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be
considered by the United States as a hostile regime."' 0 That doctrine,
however, should add a more explicit warning for Iraq and other states that
pursue weapons of mass destruction: if a hostile regime also pursues the
acquisition or development of chemical, biological or nuclear weapons,
the decisive use of anticipatory military force to end that regime is a
legitimate response.

279. See infra Part II.
280. Address to a Joint Session of the Congress and the American People, 37 WKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 1347, 1349 (Sept. 20, 2001).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol15/iss2/1

54

20021

I

ERVENTo

IN IRAQ: TOWARDS A DOCTRINE OFANTICIPA TORY COUNTER-TERROsM

Posteraro: Intervention in Iraq: Towards A Doctrine of Anticipatory Counter-

205

B. The Doctrine ofAnticipatory Counter-Terrorism,CounterProliferationIntervention, and its Limitations
Proposing a new international legal doctrine for the use of force is a
grave endeavor. This proposal does so in the conviction that the use of
force paradigm outlined here will lead to greater peace and stability and
reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction. This Article proposes
that states whose regimes both foster international terrorism and
accumulate biological, chemical or nuclear weapons must be eliminated
by swift and decisive military force. Several standards can be identified to
limit this principle so that an authentic legalist rule of international law can

emerge that will minimize the scope and frequency of future crises
involving weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism."8 '
1. Preference for Multilateral Action
States seeking to engage in anticipatory counter-terrorism, counterproliferation intervention should first inquire as to the ability of
international institutions to deal with particular rogue states. Should this
appeal to international institutions fail either out of inability or
unwillingness of the institution, there should be a strong preference for
multilateral action in an effort to avoid the egregious pursuit of naked selfinterest risked by unilateral state action. Michael Glennon has noted that
"[h]istory is not without examples of exploitative alliances, but the greater
abuses by far occur when states act unilaterally. The need to persuade
allies to join in intervention makes it less likely that the intervention will
be for ulterior motives.""2 ' Nevertheless, unilateral action against terrorist
states pursuing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons is significantly
better than the danger of prolonged inaction.
2. Existence of Compelling Evidence
States seeking to use force against states for their support of
international terrorism and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction should
not proceed unless they have ascertained through compelling evidence that
a given state is actually supporting international terrorism and is in
281. Two sources have influenced the compilation of these standards. First, the ICISS Report
on The Responsibility to Protect, which itself explicitly found inspiration in classical just war
doctrine. ICISS Report, supra note 25 1, at 4.10-4.14. Second, Christopher Joyner and Anthony
Clark Arend's standards articulated in AnticipatoryHumanitarianIntervention: An EmergingLegal
Norm?. Joyner & Arend, supra note 242, at 43.
282. MICHAEL GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, AND
AFTER Kosovo 198-99 (2001).
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possession or in active pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. The
evidence ought to be displayed within the international community so that
states may not make empty claims based on mere suspicion or pretense.
Reasonable doubt presents too high a threshold when faced with a threat
as overwhelming and as quickly deployed as modem weapons of mass
destruction.
3. Attempted Peaceful Resolution
States contemplating an anticipatory counter-terrorism, counterproliferation intervention must attempt to peacefully resolve the crisis.
This would involve diplomatic action, attempts to improve transparency
through effective inspection regimes, and providing fair warning to the
rogue state of the imminence of military action. The seriousness of the
threat and the profound cost of prolonged delay make reliance on a
doctrine of exhaustion of peaceful alternatives too burdensome to
contemplate.
4. Proportionality
Faced with weapons of mass destruction, very little in the way of
military response is actually disproportionate. Nevertheless, beyond the
existing corpus of rules governing the conduct of war, there must be an
explicit prohibition on the first use of weapons of mass destruction against
states that proliferate weapons of mass destruction and terrorist activity.
No doctrine could withstand the hypocrisy inherent in any claim that first
use of weapons of mass destruction would be appropriate. If, in the course
of a counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation intervention, the intervener is
attacked by weapons of mass destruction, proportionality permits
responses-in-kind. The ultimate objective of this doctrine is to prevent the
use of such weapons, and deterrence requires at least this much flexibility.
5. Non-Conquest
Absolutely pure motives cannot be reasonably required of anticipatory
counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation missions. States will be acting to
protect their own citizens against the gravest of threats and frequently the
terrorist state will already possess potent arsenals. The overthrow of a
ruling regime will frequently be a necessary goal of counter-terrorism,
counter-proliferation operations. The best means of limiting the risk of
inappropriate use of force is to require that such operations forbid
territorial or material conquest by intervening states.
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While international organizations, such as the United Nations, have not
effectively governed the rules of intervention, they are better suited to
nation-building after an intervention. Either the United Nations or
coalitions of concerned states should oversee the political future of states
subject to this form of intervention. The rebuilding of defeated states must
happen swiftly, perhaps in anticipation of or in concert with the initial
intervention.
6. Reasonableness
This limit emerges out of classical just war theory and it requires that
there must be a reasonable prospect of success in any military campaign.
If an intervening state cannot establish a reasonable prospect that the
intervention will successfully end the threat justifying the military action,
it must not act. Furthermore, such success cannot be the only measure of
reasonableness. If the consequences of pursuing such success will be
worse than the consequences of inaction, states must refrain from
anticipatory counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation operations. This limit
would forbid any campaign against a major nuclear power such as the
United States, Russia, or China - the prospect of nuclear holocaust is
simply too grave.
Together these standards effectively limit a doctrine of anticipatory
counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation intervention that will legitimately
reflect the underlying geopolitical reality. These limitations, if adhered to,
will eliminate the ability of states to use the doctrine as a pretense for less
legitimate ambitions. This doctrine will place the world on notice that the
international community will not tolerate the convergence of state support
for international terrorism and state-pursuit of weapons of mass
destruction.
C. Realizing the New Intervention Doctrine
The means by which the doctrine of anticipatory counter-terrorism,
counter-proliferation becomes a part of recognized international law is
rather ancillary to the focus of this Article, which has been the need for
such a doctrine. Nevertheless, it is important to note how this doctrine may
become a recognized tenet of international law. At least three possibilities
present themselves.
1. The U.N. Security Council Practice
In his book, The GreatestThreat, Richard Butler, former Chairman of
UNSCOM, proposes a sort of gentleman's agreement to address the
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proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." 3 In the opinion of Butler,

the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction is too serious to be
addressed by the politics of the U.N. Security Council.2 He considers the
veto too great an obstacle to reducing the proliferation of such weapons.8 5
He proposes that:
[C]ertainty of enforcement can be achieved if the following
steps are taken: First, the permanent members of the Security
Council must agree and solemnly declare to the-world that they will
always act together to remedy any situation identified by a credible
report on the violation of [weapons of mass destruction] treaties.
Second, this must mean that they will undertake286
never to use or to
circumstances.
such
in
veto
their
use
to
threaten
His proposal recognizes that conflicts such as the current impasse with
Iraq will present themselves in the future and military action will be
necessary to destroy weapons of mass destruction and the capacity of
rogue states to create them. His idea provides essentially a back-door
attempt to dress anticipatory counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation
intervention in U.N. Charter legitimacy.
This proposal is unlikely to prove successful. Iraq has cultivated
favorable relationships with Russia, China, and France. These
relationships have complicated U.N. attempts to reinvigorate weapons
inspections.287 While this proposal works well in the abstract where there
is no special relationship between a rogue regime and a permanent
member of the U.N. Security Council, in reality some member of the U.N.
Security Council will often have something to gain from using their veto.
The inability of the U.N. Security Council to overcome the narrow
national interests of its permanent members will likely prevent even an
informal gentleman's agreement from realizing the doctrine of anticipatory
counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation intervention. The U.N. Security
Council could not come to such a gentleman's agreement even in the case
of humanitarian intervention in Kosovo where it is difficult to argue that
any member had vital interests at stake in the outcome ofthe crisis. 28 Why
283. See BUTLER, supra note 17, at 233-42.

284. See id. at 235.
See id.
Id. at 238.
See Pollack, supra note 156.
Richard D. Bilder, Kosovo and the New Interventionism: Promise or Peril?, 9 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 153, 157 (1999).
285.
286.
287.
288.
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would such a system fail in the realm of humanitarian intervention but
succeed for anticipatory counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation
intervention? It likely will not make a difference; old habits are difficult
to break.
2. An International Constitutional Momene 89
Humanity has a tendency to coalesce after times of grave conflict in
pursuit of lasting regimes dedicated to the establishment of a lasting peace.
The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 followed the Thirty Years War. The
Congress ofVienna followed the Napoleonic Wars. The League of Nations
followed World War I and World War II produced the United Nations.
Paper treaties, the world has often agreed, offer an improvement over
power politics."9 International regimes crumble not so much because they
are futile endeavors but because they are bypassed by world events.
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, in recognizing the challenges of the new
threats posed by international terrorism, has called for the international
community to amend the international legal system because,
[t]o respond adequately and effectively to the threats and challenges
that are emerging in this new paradigm, we need new rules. Just as
in 1945, the nations of the world today face an international
constitutional moment.... In this new constitutional moment, the
world's nations must come together at the outset rather than at its
end.29'
Professor Slaughter proposes an amendment to Article 2(4) to establish
a principle of civilian inviolability. 292 Her proposal does not specifically

289. This phrase is respectfully borrowed from Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, who herself
was influenced by Professor Bruce Ackerman's writings on domestic constitutional "moments."
Slaughter, supra note 268, at 2 (citing BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 20,

26 (1998)); see also Bruce Ackerman, AGeneration ofBetrayal, 65 FORDHAML. REv. 1519, 1519
(1997). '
290. See GLENNON, supra note 282, at 192.
291. Slaughter, supra note 268, at 2 (citations omitted).
292. Id. While Slaughter does not address the specific confrontation with Iraq, nor the general
crisis ofthe proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to rogue regimes, her proposal to establish
a principle of civilian inviolability could prove to be an important element of the fight against the
convergence of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism in at least two ways. First,
Slaughter's recommended norm of civilian inviolability augments the movement towards
conceptualizing sovereignty as a responsibility to protect. Id. at 2-3. The most troublesome feature
of weapons of mass destruction is that they cannot discriminate between civilian and military
targets. The second way is through her emphasis on the individualization of international law. A
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address the threat posed by Iraq or the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, but her proposed means of establishing a new doctrine in
international law may provide a viable forum through which to establish
a doctrine of anticipatory counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation
intervention. Indisputably, such an approach comports significant
legitimacy on an emerging doctrine - "the dignity of a solemnly
' The appropriate moment to solemnize this doctrine in
negotiated text."293
a text, however, has not arrived. Nonproliferation doctrines already exist,
and Iraq has signed and then violated many of the most important of these
treaties."' Furthermore, Iraqi weapons pose too immediate of a threat to
await the outcome of prolonged negotiation and compromise that
inevitably will occupy the crafters of new international constitutional
principles. While it would be preferable if a written doctrine could be
fashioned both preventing states from pursuing weapons of mass
destruction and empowering the international community with viable
enforcement tools, it appears that consensus is simply not yet present and time is short. An international constitutional moment may yet arise
from the impending invasion of Iraq, but for now, new doctrine must
emerge from legitimate state practice.
3. State Practice
While the more prominent and predictable form of international law
emerges from treaties and conventions, perhaps the least violated doctrines
of international law emerge from customary state practice. This is largely
because rules of customary state practice that are widely violated cease to
be recognized as law; treaties and conventions that are violated remain on
the dusty shelves of diplomatic offices. State practice provides the best
chance for the proposed doctrine of anticipatory counter-terrorism,
counter-proliferation intervention to eventually become a recognized
international legal doctrine.
If the doctrine of anticipatory counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation
intervention is to become international law it will likely do so through the
processes by which state practice becomes customary international law.
This means that, for now, the United States will have to show the honest

valuable component of any counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation regime should include

holding individual terrorists and government officials who develop weapons of mass destruction
accountable. Id. at 13-16.
293. GLENNON, supra note 282, at 193.
294. See infra Part II(E)(3).
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courage to say that an intervention in Iraq is not strictly legal by existing
standards - but that it is legitimate and ought to be legal. After the
intervention is finished, the question will arise over time: When and how
will the doctrine of anticipatory counter-terrorism, counter-proliferation
intervention become clearly legal?
Legality becomes clear once the doctrine has become "authoritative
state practice."29 The authoritativeness of a rule is determined by
examining "official and unofficial communications by decision-making
elites., 296 Michael Glennon has expanded on that standard by requiring
that new intervention regimes receive "long-term, sustained acceptance.
.. throughout the community of nations... [by states which] believe that
the decision to intervene has been made to pursue just objectives."' State
practice is the measure of control a given doctrine exerts on state behavior.
"the rule is controlling if international actors comply with the
Put simply,
8
rule."

29

Military action to remove the threat of chemical, biological and nuclear
proliferation in Iraq is not so much a strategic option as it is a strategic
imperative. The risk of inaction in the face of such a threat is intolerable.
Justice need not operate through statutes, charters or custom. The NATO
intervention in Kosovo proved this to much of the world. 299 The United
States must describe its motives with honesty and promote the
establishment of new rules better suited for the new threats of the TwentyFirst Century. State practice is, in the long term, the ultimate arbiter of
what international law is. It is a consequence of this fact that more
powerful states will exert the greatest influence on the development of
international law, and the United States should not hesitate to take the lead
in practicing the legitimate doctrine of anticipatory counter-terrorism,
counter-proliferation intervention."l

295. Anthony Clark Arend, Towards an Understanding of InternationalLegal Rules, in
INTERNATIONAL RULES, at 300 (Robert J. Beck et al. eds., 1996) (emphasis omitted).

296. Id. at 301.
297. GLENNON, supra note 282, at 193.
298. Arend, supra note 295, at 192.
299. See Glennon, supra note 247, at 2.
300. Alan D. Surchin, Note, Terror and the Law: The UnilateralUse ofForce and the June
1993 Bombing of Baghdad,5 DUKE J.COMP. & INT'L L. 457, 457 n. I (1995).
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V. CONCLUSION

A. A Cautionary Note
U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in a discussion of the legitimacy
of humanitarian intervention, cautioned of the "danger of such
interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system
created after the Second World War, and of setting dangerous precedents
for future interventions without a clear criterion to decide who might
invoke these precedents and under what circumstances."' ' The greatest
risk of championing a new intervention paradigm of anticipatory counterterrorism, counter-proliferation intervention is that it will be
misunderstood or manipulated. For example, India, citing the presence of
residual al Qaeda leaders in the Pakistani-Afghan border, and Pakistan's
nuclear arsenal, could try to assert that a massive invasion to depose
General Musharaff would be appropriate under this doctrine. Such flimsy
justification would both fail the literal application ofthe standards iterated
in Part IV(B) of this Article, and more importantly, be readily preventable.
States and international organizations made of reasonable people can
foresee such situations and adopt reasonable measures to prevent such
behavior. The articulation of a new norm of intervention will not suddenly
make state actors lose all sense of reason and behave in unpredictable and
destabilizing manners. Rather than engage in reckless quests to settle old
grudges with new justifications, the international community is far more
likely to pause for reflection and take a very deep breath after the U.S.
intervention in Iraq. States, by and large, are rational actors, and will likely
adopt prudent strategies, alter their conduct and recalibrate their intentions
to better account for the new intervention paradigm.0 2
B. Concluding Reflections
Saddam Hussein has developed massive stockpiles of biological and
chemical weapons. His nuclear program is likely only grams of enriched
uranium away from weaponizing a nuclear device. In the four years since
U.N. inspectors were last inside Iraq, it is impossible to know how far Iraq
has advanced its weapons of mass destruction programs. Hussein has also
systemically fostered terrorism in sophisticated training camps and
maintains relationships with some of the most prolific and deadly

301. U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.4 (1999).
302. See Glennon, supra note 194, at 24, 29 (discussing reaction to the emerging norm of
humanitarian intervention).
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international terrorist organizations of the new century.303 Hussein is a
tyrant who does not hesitate to slaughter his own people. He has not and
will not hesitate to slaughter the citizens of other countries. The United
States must not stand idly by while Iraq develops more lethal chemical and
biological agents and more effective means of delivery. The United States
need not stand idly by until Hussein strikes. The threat escalates each day
that the United Nations fails to act. The United States must act, even
unilaterally if necessary, against so grave a threat. 3'
The moment of U.S. intervention in Iraq will constitute a paradigmaltering event, and it must be embraced as such. Should the United States
decide to resort to tired political games of legal rationalization, the legality
of its behavior will not have changed, but its chance at offering a new and
righteous doctrine - with the legitimacy that inheres in such honest
leadership - might never be restored. What is most vital is that the
rationale proffered by the Bush administration at the commencement of
hostilities with Iraq be one of forethought and honesty.
Intervention to prevent the sinister marriage of international terrorism
and weapons of mass destruction is not only strategically required of the
United States, it is just and legitimate. U.S. policymakers should not be
intimidated out of action by a reverence for antiquated, anti-intervention,
international legal proscriptions. The threat posed by biological, chemical
or nuclear holocaust demands a new international legal doctrine.
Addressing this threat is imperative. If the United States uses its power to
pursue the just and legitimate goal of ending the menace posed by states
that sponsor terrorism and30 5pursue weapons of mass destruction,
international law will follow.

303. See infra Part I(F) (al Qaeda and Hamas).
304. President Bush has indicated that the United States "will not wait for the authors of mass
murder to gain weapons of mass destruction. [The United States] act[s] now because [it] will lift
this dark threat from our age and save generations to come." James Gerstenzag & David Holly, Bin
Laden Seeks to GainNuclearArms, Bush Says: TerroristsAlso Want Chemicaland Germ Weapons,
President Warns as He Tries to Rally SupportFrom Abroad,L.A. TiMES, Nov. 7,2001, at Al. See
also Joseph Nye, The New Rome Meets the New Barbarians,ECONOMIST, Mar. 23, 2002, at 25

("Faced with such a threat, a certain degree of unilateral action ... is justified if it brings global
benefits. After all, the British navy reduced the scourge of piracy well before international
conventions were signed in the middle of the 19th century.").
305. See Glennon, supra note 247, at 2.
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